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Abstract 
 In 2008 the Federal government enacted a Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(NSP) to address the neighborhood effects of the late-2000s foreclosure crisis. Congress 
subsequently funded a second and third NSP. This research employs mixed methods to 
examine the effectiveness of the first round of the NSP in three Florida jurisdictions. The 
results are analyzed within the larger context of substantive housing theory and federal 
housing policy. The success of the program is evaluated using a mixed-scanning 
procedural planning theoretical framework. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Federal efforts to address the foreclosure crisis at the community level have had 
mixed results. The current foreclosure crisis impacts households, neighborhoods, and the 
national economy. At the neighborhood level, a concentration of foreclosures can cause a 
deterioration of neighboring home values and increase vacancies. High vacancy rates and 
disinvestment in a neighborhood undermine its vitality and create a vicious cycle of 
decline. This process is called the contagion effect of foreclosure.  
 In 2008, the federal government enacted the Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(NSP) to address the contagion effect of foreclosure. The program was implemented 
through local governments. Supporters of the program claim that over three years the 
three rounds of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program have created 88,000 jobs, and 
handled 33,000 properties. 
This research examines whether the NSP effectively alleviates the neighborhood 
impacts of foreclosure. It also examines the relationship between the goals of federal 
housing policy, and the realities of local implementation. Hopefully this exploration of a 
particular policy relating to neighborhood level community development will aid 
practitioners in future policy implementation, aide policy makers crafting empirically 
grounded policy, and indicate opportunities for more robust scholarly treatment of the 
NSP.   
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 In the next chapter, I summarize the existing literature on the neighborhood 
stabilization program and point to the contribution this research will make to that body of 
literature. The first part of the literature review follows an historical chronology.  In order 
to provide the context of the NSP the chapter begins with an overview of the economic 
and financial conditions that created the foreclosure crisis. The background leads to the 
financial crisis of 2007 and the collapse of the secondary mortgage market. At that point 
the literature review narrows, segueing through the rapid rise in foreclosure triggered by 
the market correction into a more substantive discussion of the neighborhood effects of 
concentrated foreclosure. The contagion effect of foreclosure is a catchall term that 
encompasses the cumulative spatial, economic, and social effects of foreclosure. I survey 
five specific effects indicated in the literature: magnified declines in home values, 
increased crime, effects on education and families, a diminished tax base, and aggregate 
societal cost. Following the outline of the foreclosure deluge and its origin in the 
financial markets I describe the various policies designed to respond to the crisis, 
specifically the NSP and its implementation. The literature review concludes with an 
acknowledgment of alternative policy proposals intended to address the neighborhood 
effects of foreclosure, vacancy, and abandonment.  
 Identifying a procedural-planning theory provides the necessary evaluative tools 
to understand the substantive neighborhood policies examined here. Chapter Three 
outlines the theoretical framework used to analyze and interpret the examination of the 
NSP. It begins with a review of the rational planning model, also known as synoptic 
planning, articulated by Edward Banfield. Even as Banfield described the process of 
planning and policy implementation, Charles Lindblom asserted that agents of public 
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policy were constrained by the political process and must cast off any delusions of 
comprehensiveness instead opting to “muddle through” a series of small incremental 
movements. After discussing Lindblom’s incrementalist alternative to synoptic planning, 
Chapter Three introduces the further refinement of procedural planning theory by Emitai 
Etzioni, mixed-scanning. A variant of mixed-scanning is adopted as the analytical 
structure for this work. The balance of the chapter discusses broad substantive housing 
policy over the last half century before narrowing the focus on the rationale for the NSP. 
 Chapter Four reviews the technical administration of the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program in Florida.  Although Congress and the administration allowed 
grantees wide discretion to choose techniques for implementation, there are 
programmatic prescriptions and prohibitions. Many of the programmatic constraints are 
adopted through the primary funding mechanism, the Community Development Block 
Grant (CDBG). The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has 
guidelines in place for CDBG grantees, most of which apply to NSP grantees. In Florida, 
NSP grantees have chosen a variety of strategies for implementation that go beyond the 
purchase, renovation and resale of distressed single family homes. The variety of 
technical practices employed by Florida jurisdictions reflects differing staff capacities, 
local real estate market conditions, and diverse local political cultures. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the most technically challenging aspect of the NSP, the 
congressional directive that 25% of the initial funds and all programmatic income benefit 
low-income households.  
 The research design is in Chapter Five. The chapter begins with the research 
question, whether the NSP has effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure. 
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The question is followed by the working hypothesis, that the NSP has modestly contained 
price declines and that it has not contained other contagion effects. The chapter also 
identifies the challenge of defining and operationalizing foreclosure. Most of Chapter 
Five outlines the study area and the data sources employed in this research. The chapter 
also includes the methods used to collect and treat quantitative and qualitative data. 
 The quantitative analysis is in Chapter Six. The Chapter begins by further 
elaborating on the methodology introduced in Chapter Five. Then the observations are 
presented for three neighborhoods receiving NSP funds, and three similar neighborhoods 
not receiving NSP funds. In each neighborhood, distressed and non-distressed homes are 
identified. First, the baseline pre-crisis average value for each home is identified. Then, 
the relationship between the appraised values of the distressed properties, and appraised 
values of the non-distressed properties, is measured using the mean ratio of difference of 
intrinsic value. Post crisis observations are taken on the same property using 2011 
appraisals. These data are then treated with regression analysis using Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. The results indicate that the limited sample is 
not statistically significant, implying that the findings within the sampled neighborhoods 
may not reflect the general trend in the entire universe of NSP neighborhoods. Within the 
examined neighborhoods, there is no clear relationship between NSP spending and losses 
of intrinsic home values. Moreover, the descriptive data imply that there may not even be 
a deleterious contagion effect of foreclosure measurable as a decline in appraised 
property values. In at least two of the neighborhoods examined here, non-distressed home 
owners actually experienced increases in relative value when their neighbors experienced 
foreclosure.  
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 Chapter Seven consists of case studies of ten neighborhoods, the six included in 
the qualitative analysis and four others. The neighborhoods are located in three counties 
in different regions of Florida. Each county is presented as a section within the chapter 
with an overview of the local cultural and economic context. Each neighborhood is 
introduced with a summary of its demography, household tenure, and housing stock. 
These figures are then illustrated with personal observations of the neighborhood 
condition and the state of the housing stock with particular focus on properties in close 
proximity to NSP purchased housing units.  
 The final chapter consists of conclusions about the effectiveness of the 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program. The chapter contains three parts. In the first 
section, I acknowledge the limitations of this research, specifically the elements of the 
research design that limit the generalizability of the findings. In the second section I 
summarize and synthesize the findings of this research linking them to the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter Three. The final section includes policy implications. The 
policy implications discussion points out some of the strengths and weaknesses of NSP 
implementation in Florida and indicates some of the lessons that might inform future 
neighborhood policy and planning practice.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The federal government has implemented several policy responses to address the 
ongoing foreclosure crisis in the United States. They fall into three broad categories. 
First, are macro-level policies aimed at preventing further high-risk lending, this category 
includes the re-regulation of the secondary mortgage market. Second, are micro-level 
foreclosure prevention programs like the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP) which help homeowners facing financial hardships keep their homes. Finally, 
there are programs that seek to deal with the impacts of foreclosure on communities and 
correct the negative externalities of foreclosure. The Neighborhood Stabilization Program 
(NSP) is in this category. The rationale for enacting the NSP is grounded in the 
proposition that there is a ‘contagion effect’ of foreclosure. The contagion effect is the 
increased likelihood of mortgage default and other negative indicators of neighborhood 
health that occur around a foreclosed or abandoned property.  
Florida, one of the states hardest hit by the crisis, provides an excellent 
opportunity to observe the efficacy of federal policy interventions to solve neighborhood 
level problems. In May 2009, news reports indicated that 11% of Florida mortgages were 
in some stage of foreclosure, making the most severely affected state in the nation at the 
time (Howley, 2009). In the past three years California, Nevada, and Florida have 
alternated the title of most foreclosed.  This research will focus on the deployment of the 
NSP in select Florida jurisdictions. The results will demonstrate whether the program has 
effectively mitigated the contagion effect. 
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Since 2007, the United States has experienced a foreclosure crisis. A sharp rise in 
foreclosure rates and an attendant decline in real estate values characterize the crisis. In 
response, the federal government has enacted a host of policy interventions in housing 
and financial markets. This chapter examines the scholarly literature treating one aspect 
of the policy response, neighborhood stabilization. The literature review has eight parts. 
First, it identifies the two divergent trends in the literature.  Then, it examines the origin 
of the foreclosure crisis as it is presented in the literature. After introducing the crisis, it 
explains the academic consensus regarding the existence of the contagion effect of 
foreclosure, and the disagreements over its size and scope. Then the literature review 
introduces reports of the government’s policy responses to the crisis, and places 
neighborhood stabilization within a larger administrative framework. Specifically, it 
examines the current state of research on the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) 
and its efficacy. Then it examines scholarly treatment of the Obama Administration’s 
macro-level deployment of the policy as well critical views from within the academy. 
Finally, it specifies opportunities for research.  
The Financial Crisis The mid 2000’s housing bubble is just one of two high-risk 
mortgage bubbles in as many decades (Immergluck, 2009a). The first subprime boom and 
bust occurred during the mid-to-late 1990s. A global savings surplus drove both bubbles, 
as well as the tech-bubble sandwiched between them (Bernanke, 2005; Immergluck, 
2009c). Between 1993 and 1998, the total value of Residential Mortgage Backed 
Securities (RMBSs) grew from $35 billion to $150 billion (Immergluck, 2009a; 
Schwartz, 2010). Investor demand for RMBSs reversed the traditional asymmetries in the 
lending relationship – in which the borrower sought to conform to the lenders 
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conservative underwriting requirements – and incentivized the marketing of easy credit to 
homeowners (Schwartz, 2010). Although the period saw the standardization of 
‘subprime’ lending, this first bubble focused primarily on stripping equity from existing 
homeowners whose valuations were based on ordinary appreciation and paying down 
their original purchase-money loans. 
One of the chief characteristics of the expansion of sub-prime mortgage finance is 
the entry of non-bank originators into the market (Immergluck, 2009a). Because these 
institutions did not accept deposits, they were not subject to the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) and other regulations that require fair lending terms and 
prohibit targeting particular neighborhoods for more expensive financial products 
(Immergluck, 2009c; Schwartz, 2010). As a result, certain households and communities 
disproportionately experienced the individual and community impacts of predatory 
subprime defaults. For example, by 1998, 51% of home loan refinancing in Black 
majority communities was subprime. In White majority neighborhoods, subprime lenders 
accounted for only 9% of refinancing (Immergluck, 2009c).  
The racial disparity in the first sub-prime boom (1990s) is enormous. According 
to Immergluck, 9% market share in White neighborhoods amounted to a major increase 
in the incidence of subprime lending. The growth of subprime terms in minority 
neighborhoods, more than five times the high levels experienced in White 
neighborhoods, marks a major shift in retail home-loan finance market. As financial 
markets devised techniques for spreading risk and repackaging subprime financial 
products, the change would have wide-ranging implications for secondary markets, non-
minority neighborhoods, and the global economy. Immergluck does not disaggregate the 
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statistics for White neighborhoods, but other research indicates that the victims of 
predatory lending are frequently drawn from the poor, the elderly, and those with low 
educational attainment (Martin, 2010). Taken together, it is likely that society’s most 
vulnerable groups, spatially segregated minorities, the poor, the aged, and the poorly 
educated formed a market niche for subprime loan originators throughout the 1990’s.  
As the economic growth of the 1990’s slowed, sub-prime default rose steadily 
(Immergluck, 2009c). However, because real estate prices did not fall, and the broader 
society did not immediately feel its effects; the first wave of subprime defaults did not 
trigger a national economic crisis. Surprisingly, the losses from default did not reduce 
investor appetite for securities based on sub-prime mortgages.  
In the mid-2000’s, subprime residential financing went mainstream. After 2002 
the growing oversupply of money from global capital markets surged into U.S. residential 
mortgage origination. Larger loans with “exotic” terms expanded consumer buying-
power (Immergluck, 2009c). This greater buying power led to a speculative rise in real 
estate prices.  The result was a “virtuous cycle” of sharply rising home values 
(Immergluck, 2009c, p.342). Households needed to borrow more money to purchase a 
home, and could purchase more-expensive homes because they were able to borrow more 
money. Many entered the housing market in a rush fearing they would be priced out of 
the market if they did not act quickly (Schwartz, 2010). Put simply, consumers borrowed 
more, and more often. There was much greater demographic and spatial diversity in the 
second wave of subprime lending than in the first.   
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBSs) convert individual home loans 
into tradable investments. In order to market the product, investment brokers – far 
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removed from mortgage origination – needed to find the right mix of sub-prime loans 
(which boast highly profitable cash flows), and prime loans (which offer security but 
lower returns).  In order to avoid the risks presented by an RMBS carrying too many sub-
prime loans, brokers developed the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). In the 
unregulated private market, CDOs contained a mix of high and low risk RMBSs. These 
investments were rated and priced through a technique called “tranching” (Schwartz, 
2010, p.71). The phrase is derived from the French word tranche, meaning trench, slice, 
or portion.  A tranche is a random sample of the mortgages that comprise an RMBS or 
CDO. The entire instrument is then rated and priced based on the sample (Immergluck, 
2009c; Schwartz, 2010). In this way, high-risk mortgages are offset by lower risk 
mortgages.  Brokers then price and sell the entire package according to the market value 
of the low-risk mortgages. The availability of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) further 
obscured the risks of default by the actual homeowners, who provided the cash flows that 
gave these investments their face value (Immergluck, 2009c).  
A Credit Default Swap is an insurance agreement in which the buyer pays a 
“premium” to the seller in exchange for a guarantee that the seller will pay the buyer the 
full face value of the insured asset when an “event” occurs. In this case, the event is the 
massive default by the mortgagors whose loans are part of an RMBS/CDO. Credit 
Default Swaps were entirely unregulated in the United States from their inception in the 
mid 1990’s until the 2007 financial crisis. Apparently, sellers are not required to keep 
cash reserves to validate their obligations (requiring the Federal Reserve to inject the 
largest seller of Credit Default Swaps with $85 billion of cash in 2008). The most 
puzzling feature of CDS is that the buyer is not required to own an interest in the insured 
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asset. In other words, an investor can “bet” that investments held by other individuals and 
institutions will decline in value. Together, all of these innovations encouraged the 
investment of the world’s surplus savings in instruments ultimately collateralized by the 
United States housing market (Immergluck, 2009c; Bernanke, 2005). 
Through CDOs, subprime loans spread their toxicity throughout the world of 
housing finance. As street level origination moved away from the conservative 
underwriting requirements of traditional lenders to high-pressure sales offices at non-
bank (i.e. unregulated) institutions, banks feared a loss of market share (Immergluck, 
2009a).  Many banks and financial institutions, too conservative to involve themselves 
directly in the high-risk market, created Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to 
purchase and hold CDOs (Schwartz, 2010). According to Schwartz, parent institutions 
funded these entities with short-term loans, which were repaid from the CDOs’ regular 
cash flows (2010, p.78). The flow of money stopped abruptly once the default rate spiked 
in 2007.  The Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac – 
also purchased CDOs in order to add a greater portion of low-income homeowners to 
their portfolios. The availability of easy credit through subprime lending greatly 
diminished low-income homebuyer demand for conforming loans. As a result, Fannie 
Mae needed to purchase high-risk CDOs to meet its congressional mandates to expand 
working class homeownership (Schwartz, 2010). 
 In 2007, massive mortgage defaults triggered a sudden revision of CDO credit 
ratings (Immergluck, 2009a; Schwartz, 2010). Consequently, the financial markets 
revalued the investments. The devaluation wreaked havoc on the global financial system 
and led to the failure of CDS schemes as well as the injection of government money into 
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financial markets. At the other end of the pipeline, borrowers who intended to refinance 
out of the unrealistic terms of their mortgages could no longer access easy credit. 
Moreover, plummeting home values and rising unemployment exacerbated the problem 
and led to a wave of “strategic defaults” (Guiso et al., 2009). As loan servicers began to 
foreclose upon defaulting mortgagors, it quickly became apparent that the real estate 
collateralizing a substantial portion of the world’s financial-capital was no longer worth 
the debtors’ obligations. Institutional losses reached several billion dollars as the 
American economy entered recession in 2007.  
The Foreclosure Crisis Since 2007, the nation has faced a sharp increase in 
foreclosure filings. While the collapse of the housing market triggered a larger economic 
downturn across the nation (and around the world), the foreclosure crisis is largely 
localized.  The flurry of market activity in the mid-2000’s triggered a boom in new 
construction which led to severe oversupply in certain parts of the country. The collapse 
of the housing market largely mirrors this trend. Just five states (California, Florida, 
Arizona, Illinois and Michigan) account for more than 50% of the nation’s foreclosures 
(Harding et al, 2009; Kingsley et al, 2009; Realty Trac, 2011). Even within these states, 
the incidence of foreclosure is unevenly distributed, most severely affecting poor 
neighborhoods and newly built areas (Strom & Reader, 2011). The national foreclosure 
rate peaked in October of 2009 (Schwartz, 2010). Nonetheless, communities are still 
dealing with the aftermath of the crisis.  
The Contagion Effect of Foreclosure According to Kai-Yan Lee, former senior 
research associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, foreclosure affects 
neighborhoods in three ways: 1) supply; 2) valuation; and 3) blight (Lee, 2008). The 
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impact of supply is obvious; in the idiom of economics, supply exceeds demand leading 
to lower price equilibrium. Blight refers to qualitative decline that flows from deferred 
maintenance and the opportunities for criminality that come from vacant and neglected 
homes (Kingsley et al, 2009; Lee, 2008). Valuation denotes the practice of determining 
the sale price and taxable value of a property based on recent nearby sales, or 
“comparables” (Lee, 2008). Research reveals that the market substantially discounts 
distressed homes (Wassmer, 2010). This discount infects the neighboring non-distressed 
homes, causing homes in close proximity to a foreclosure to experience a decline in value 
greater than the average decline in value for similar homes in the same market (Lauria, 
1998; Lee, 2008; Wassmer, 2010; Immergluck & Smith, 2006).  
A single distressed property is oncogenic and infectious. The aggregate effect of a 
concentration of distressed properties renders a neighborhood unhealthy and diseased. 
Much of the literature describes the community effects of foreclosure in epidemiological 
terms. This is not new; researchers have observed the “community contagion effect” 
since at least the mid-1990s (Lauria, 1998). In fact, Ben Bernanke, the Princeton 
economist turned Federal Reserve chairman, observed in 1983 that credit defaults 
(including mortgage loans) during the early years of the Great Depression led to more 
defaults and prolonged the economic crisis of the 1930s (Bernanke, 1983).  
Ceteris paribus, a single foreclosure will lead to a reduction in the value of 
neighboring properties. Additionally, the current crisis appears to have amplified the 
effect of foreclosure on neighborhood property values (Wassmer, 2010). Since 2007, the 
loss per non-distressed household has increased. In other words, the current contagion 
effect is larger than in a normally functioning market (Wassmer, 2010, p. 23-24). 
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Wassmer found that it is several times larger, while others have found more modest 
increases. Although there is considerable disagreement over the size of the contagion 
effect, researchers consistently find that, 1) it exists; and 2) its observed impact is greater 
than normal in the date range of 2006-2011 (Wassmer, 2010; Immergluck & Smith, 
2006; Schuetz, Been, & Ellen, 2008). Wassmer found that the sale of a single distressed 
property led to an aggregate “$1.1012 billion reduction in the price of non-REOs over 
[an] 18 month period observed in the Sacramento area” (2010, p. 23). Real Estate Owned 
(REO) is a commonly used abbreviation to denote properties owned by financial 
institutions. An REO sale occurs when a homebuyer purchases a bank-owned home. 
While there is an academic consensus distressed homes are contagious, it is 
difficult to determine how far reaching their effects are (Harding et al, 2009). Many 
researchers have found that a foreclosure adversely affects the value of immediately 
neighboring properties. While there are other negative externalities flowing from 
foreclosed and abandoned homes, the decline in property values is most easily 
quantifiable and formed a major part of the rationale for enactment of the NSP in public 
discourse.   
Home Values Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao, tested the assertion that foreclosure 
depresses neighboring home values. They found that there was a significant correlation 
between foreclosure and the decline in the value of immediately neighboring properties. 
Moreover, Harding et al found that the effect lingered for up to two years after the REO 
sale. Although they found that the data supported the federal intervention in the housing 
market, they noted that “a million additional foreclosures would significantly affect three 
to five million homes not the forty million that has been estimated using earlier estimates 
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of contagion effects” (Harding et al, p. 178). However, Harding et al limited their 
analysis to the impact on the market value of neighboring properties and not the 
comprehensive community effects of foreclosure.  
Vacant properties alter neighborhoods in other ways (Immergluck, 2011; 
Kingsley et al, 2009).  These include crime, a reduced tax base, educational performance, 
demographic change, the destruction of neighborhood social networks, and declining 
incomes (Kingsley et al, 2009; Lauria, 1998; Immergluck, 2009a). In contrast to property 
values, these effects are difficult to measure and are arguably less amenable to policy 
intervention. Some of the literature, particularly that written by planners,  reflects a 
normative view that the chief rationale for a policy of neighborhood stabilization is to 
achieve social justice and reform the market based allocation of housing resources. These 
writers focus on the contagion effects that are more difficult to quantify. The 
contributions of economists, on the other hand, displays a normative preference for 
concrete measurable such as home values, unemployment numbers, sales volumes and 
new housing starts.  
Crime Crime is one of the most compelling and measurable non-financial 
impacts of foreclosure. In Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, crime analyst Michael 
Bess found that neighborhoods with high foreclosure rates experienced increases in 
violent crime three times greater than other neighborhoods (2008). In Chicago, Smith and 
Immergluck found a positive correlation between the foreclosure rate and the crime rate 
(2006). Specifically, they found that a 1% increase in the foreclosure rate corresponds to 
more than 2.3% increase in violent crime (2006, p. 862). Naturally, spikes in foreclosure 
also lead to increased neighborhood turnover (Kingsley et al, 2009).  An increase in 
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vacant homes and a sense of impermanence may create an atmosphere of criminality and 
threaten neighborhood order (Kingsley et al, 2009).   Other research confirms that there is 
a clear relationship between foreclosure and violent crime (Martin, 2010).  
Education & Families Foreclosure affects education. According to Anne Martin 
of the University of California, Berkely, “children [whose families experience 
foreclosure, have] difficulties concentrating in school, affecting classroom dynamics in 
their new schools” (Martin, 2010, p. 7). In this way, the effects of foreclosure move from 
one neighborhood to another.  In addition, Martin found that in California, state licensed 
home based childcare providers were going out of business because their households 
faced foreclosure (2010, p. 13). Reduced opportunities for affordable childcare in a 
community negatively impacts families who may not themselves face foreclosure.  
Diminished Tax Base Falling home values result in a diminished property tax 
base, as well as abandonment and slow payment by banks who take possession of 
foreclosed properties. Local governments depend on property taxes to fund essential 
services like trash collection and police protection (Immergluck & Smith, 2006). 
Consequently, declining property tax revenue leads to a reduction of services that affects 
all households in a jurisdiction (Wassmer, 2010). Foreclosures also cause local 
governments to spend more (Kingsley et al, 2009). Many communities have entered a 
vicious cycle of decline in which falling home values force a reduction of services that in 
turn leads to further reductions in value. Ultimately, institutions and investors decide to 
wait out the market and hold the vacant property in their portfolio indefinitely with 
minimal maintenance, or else abandon the property all together. Unable to police the 
neighborhood, remove trash, or enforce building and safety codes, local governments 
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repeat the pattern of abandonment. Consequently, homeowners who are only marginally 
able to pay their mortgages become discouraged and default. In this way, foreclosures 
reproduce themselves.  
Societal Cost The total cost of a single foreclosure is staggering. In a study 
funded by the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, William Apgar and Mark Duda 
of the Harvard Joint Center for Housing Studies, found that each foreclosure costs local 
government up to $19,229 (2005). Based on these figures Kingsley, Smith, and Price 
calculated an average societal cost of $79,443 for every foreclosure (2009). In addition to 
the cost to local government, this figure includes the loss to the homeowner, the legal and 
administrative costs to the bank, and the costs to adjacent homeowners (Kingsley et al, 
2009).  
The Kingsley et al assessment may actually underestimate the per foreclosure 
cost. They rely on Smith and Immergluck’s 2006 determination that the contagion effect 
amounts to 0.9% depreciation in immediately neighboring home values. In their analysis, 
Smith and Immergluck employ data from a relatively healthy housing market, Chicago in 
the late 1990s. More recent research shows a far greater effect on property values, 
especially in severely impacted markets. Wassmer found that between January 2008 and 
June 2009 non-distressed homes in Sacramento suffered a 31.9% loss in value because of 
nearby distressed home sales (2010). Others have found much less astounding contagion 
effects, rarely exceeding 10% (Lee, 2008; Schuetz et al, 2008). Nonetheless, their 
findings confirm that the current contagion effect is larger than Smith and Immergluck 
observed in Chicago in the 1990s. 
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Martin describes the foreclosure crisis as a social catastrophe (2010). She 
compares it to a mass displacement and a graphic illustration of social inequality. 
According to Martin, the crisis has an impact on communities comparable to a natural 
disaster and the public policy response should reflect the severity of the situation (2010, 
p. 13).  
Policy Responses 
The federal government has deployed three forms of intervention to respond to 
the foreclosure crisis (Wassmer, 2010, p. 25). The interventions’ policy goals are: 1) 
reduce the likelihood of further defaults and forfeitures ex ante; 2) reform the markets for 
housing and housing finance to prevent a reiteration of the crisis; and 3) intercede ex post 
to ease the effects of foreclosures that have already occurred (Immergluck, 2008; 
Kingsley et al, 2009). This final goal – alleviating the effects of foreclosure after the 
forfeiture has occurred – has two prongs: a) assistance to households directly affected by 
foreclosure; and b) mitigating the neighborhood and community effects of foreclosure 
and abandonment.  
Between 2008 and 2009, the federal government enacted a far-reaching package 
of new programs and reforms to address each goal. In response to the first goal – 
stemming the flood of defaults – the government created the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP). Market reform – the second goal – is underway as part 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, specifically title 
fourteen of the law, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2010).  
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To address the impacts on households directly impacted by the crisis, congress 
enacted several new laws. First, the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act allows 
homeowners who have had substantial mortgage debt forgiven after a foreclosure, short-
sale, or deed-in-lieu transaction, to avoid paying income tax on the forgiven debt 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2011).  Second, congress enacted the Protecting Tenants at 
Foreclosure Act of 2009, which supersedes state laws and modifies federal law to require 
successors-in-interest (e.g. foreclosing banks and investors) to honor the terms of an 
existing lease agreement until the expiration of its term (Federal Reserve Bank, 2009).  
To mitigate the effects of foreclosure on communities, Congress created, and then 
expanded, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (Turner, 2010). 
The NSPs 
The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) is designed to mitigate the 
negative externalities of foreclose. There are actually three NSPs. Congress enacted the 
first, referred to as NSP1, as part of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) in 
July 2008 (Immergluck, 2009b; Carr & Mulcahy, 2010). The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) disbursed the funds through Community Development Block 
Grants (CDBG). The Department of Housing and Urban Development used a formula to 
award grants to states and local governments ensuring that every state received some part 
of the funding.  
The federal government authorized the second program, NSP2, as part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in early 2009 (Carr & Mulcahy, 
2010; Immergluck, 2009b). The ARRA is often referred to as ‘The Stimulus’ in popular 
discourse. Unlike NSP1, HUD awards NSP2 on a competitive basis. In addition, non-
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profits and associations of non-profits became eligible for direct funding under NSP2 
(Immergluck, 2009b). Previously such entities could only participate as contractors for 
local governments. This provision directed funds to organizations experienced in the 
provision of low-income housing. Grantees can only use the funds in tracts especially 
hard hit by the foreclosure crisis (Deng & Freeman, 2011).  
Congress allocated an additional $1 billion to neighborhood stabilization as part 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer protection Act of 2010 (US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). This third wave of funding is 
referred to as NSP3. The third iteration of NSP automatically increased every state grant 
below $5 million to that amount. In addition, it increased the minimum grant to $1 
million.  
Congress made clear its intent that the funds be narrowly targeted to the 
neighborhoods with the greatest need. Many feared that if the money was spread thinly 
across many communities it would have little effect. To award the funds, HUD used a 
predictive formula to identify census tracts of greatest need. The formula used 
unemployment change, the rate of highly leveraged loans (with different weights based 
on the frequency of high cost terms), vacancy rates, and the fall of home values in the 
local real estate market (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). The 
unemployment information must come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); 
vacancy rates come from the United States Postal Service (USPS); the loan information is 
derived from the Federal Reserve Board’s catalog of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) data; the information on property valuation is based on Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) information about metro area housing markets (US Department 
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of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). Funds were then allocated to the highest 
need jurisdictions with the most properties “at risk of becoming Real Estate Owned” 
based on the location’s share of the state’s foreclosure starts. All these factors are 
weighted and indexed to a 0-20 score. A score of 20 indicates a neighborhood severely 
affected by foreclosure. Every neighborhood examined here has a score of 18-20.  
Policy Deployment 
The goal of the NSP is mitigation of the neighborhood effects of foreclosure 
through rapid deployment of federal funds to local government. Enactment of the NSPs 
clearly signals a change in course from the ideological attachment to laissez-faire 
economic policy over the past two decades. Margery Austin Turner, resident scholar and 
Vice President for Research at the Urban Institute, echoes the sentiments of many 
planning scholars when she writes that the passage of NSP2 reflects the Obama 
Administration’s renewed focus on urban policy, as well as a “commitment to evidence 
based policy making” (Turner, 2010, p. 34).  
In addition to focusing the federal government on community affairs, the NSP 
also acknowledges the hometown expertise of local governments and offers a great deal 
of flexibility in deployment. Grantees can use the funds to demolish properties, land bank 
properties, purchase homes for community land trusts, directly purchase and manage real 
estate, or assist investors and homebuyers to purchase properties. Policy implementation 
has been uneven, with some jurisdictions rapidly deploying the funds, others 
encountering procedural roadblocks, and still others simply failing to act (Strom, 2010). 
 
 22 
 
Alternative Policy Proposals In his book Sunburnt Cities, Justin Hollander 
explains how the collapse of the real estate bubble affected the Sunbelt. Hollander 
compared Sunbelt cities in crisis with Rustbelt cities that experienced de-industrialization 
in previous decades. He compiled the planning techniques used to respond to the decline 
to see which worked and which did not. Most importantly, Hollander formulated a 
predictive model of the physical effects of population decline.  
Hollander found that vacancy and abandonment occurs in a discernible pattern. 
Ultimately, he suggests that sprawling low-density communities embrace what he calls 
“shrinkage” and decline gracefully. Essentially, Hollander proposes that local 
governments use a combination of direct and indirect interventions to decrease densities 
in peripheral neighborhoods. The technique outlined in Sunburnt Cities is to purchase and 
demolish vacant homes then offer the lots for sale to adjacent property owners at low or 
no cost provided they agree to a Land Use Restriction Agreement (LURA) that prohibits 
the construction of new improvements or subdivision of the property. Meanwhile, 
Hollander suggests that planners incentivize development in the urban center and use the 
opportunity of the foreclosure crisis to channel private enterprise into a more sustainable 
pattern of development. Neighborhood Stabilization Program guidelines allow grantees to 
use up to 10% of their NSP funding for demolition. Therefore, it is possible that 
communities could choose to adopt this two pronged strategy by demolishing the vacant 
homes in peripheral neighborhoods and concentrate other funds for renovation and 
acquisition in the central city.  
Sunburnt Cities provides concrete examples of the techniques planners can use to 
respond to the foreclosure crisis. Although the book focuses on communities 
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experiencing population decline, which is not occurring evenly throughout Florida, it 
offers insight into how any community can respond to crisis. Hollander also shows that 
the negative impacts of foreclosure are predictable and correlate to a number of known 
variables.  Neighborhood stabilization funds are allocated using a similar formula and 
Hollander’s explanation provides insight into the why and how of the formula’s 
predicative capability.        
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
This chapter outlines a theoretical framework to analyze the effective 
implementation of a specific federal housing policy, the NSP. I begin by introducing the 
policy in question, and summarize the challenges that such an analysis presents. Then, I 
proceeds in four sections. The first section scrutinizes rational planning and its 
applicability to housing policy implementation. The second section examines 
incrementalism, an alternative procedural planning theory. The third section refines the 
rationalist-incrementalist dialectic by exploring mixed-scanning, a third approach that 
proposes to mediate between rationalism and incrementalism. The final section concludes 
with the summary of a theoretical model with which to analyze the federal program. The 
final section also includes a discussion of the specific challenges to systematic study of 
federal housing policy, tailoring the framework to the specific characteristics of NSP 1, 
and the cultural and political idiosyncrasies of the communities studied.  
The Root Synoptic planning – or the Rational Planning Model (RPM) – was the first 
fully articulated procedural planning theory (Hudson, 1979). The RPM is planning in the 
common meaning of the word (Banfield, 1959, p. 361). The model asks where the actor 
in any given situation wants to go and how she intends to get there. As an evaluative tool, 
the RPM asks whether the actor arrived at the desired end, or at least whether she is 
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closer than when she began. Charles Lindblom, in a critical analysis of the RPM, 
describes rational decision making as a “root,” referring to its linearity (Lindblom, 1959, 
80). Synoptic planning is grounded in the modern Western tradition of rational decision-
making and relies upon binary propositions of good and not good. Barclay Hudson 
attributes the analytical power of the RPM to its simplicity and adaptability to a broad 
range of problems (Hudson, 1979, p. 389). 
Edward C. Banfield was one of the great expositors of synoptic planning. In a 1959 
article entitled “Ends and Means in Planning” Banfield outlined the general framework of 
the RPM and described its limitations. The article is an excellent point of departure for 
any discussion of procedural planning models.  
The critics of synoptic planning overstate its deficiencies. Banfield acknowledges that 
“no choice can ever be perfectly rational” (1959, p. 362). Nonetheless, he contends that 
the inability of real human beings to consider every possible consequence and draft a 
fully comprehensive plan to attain a desired end, does not negate the utility of rational 
decision-making. Given this reality, Banfield defines a rational decision as “one in which 
alternatives and consequences are considered as fully as the decision maker, given the 
time and other resources available to him, can afford to consider them” (1959, p. 362). 
Therefore, the exclusive criteria for evaluating a means employed to attain any given 
policy goal are 1) whether the actors involved considered all the alternative and 
consequences they were able to; and 2) whether the means ultimately achieve the desired 
end.  
 From Banfield’s point of view, “it is by the process of rational choice that the best 
adaptation of means to ends is likely to be achieved;” and it is through the calculating 
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process of rational choice that they are to be evaluated (1959, p. 361). With 
characteristically pre-1960 confidence, he posits, “good planning” is “likely to attain the 
ends or maximize the chances of their attainment” (Banfield, 1959, p. 361). Presumably, 
the rational binary reduces any plan that does not achieve the desired end to not good.  
The persuasive power of Banfield’s argument is its candid recognition of the lack of 
planning in public policy. Banfield makes the counterintuitive observation that a lack of 
planning characterized the United States even at the height of its industrial and 
geopolitical power.  Banfield bemoans the narrowness and shortsightedness of private 
sector planning and the absence of planning altogether in the public sector. The little 
planning that was evident in public projects was anything but rational, according to 
Banfield (1959, p. 363). Instead, it reflected various conflicting means and ends 
haphazardly formulated in the disjointed power centers of the American political process.  
The saga of the Chicago Public Housing Authority illustrates the point (Banfield, 
1959, p. 364-366). First, a set of national goals and prescribed means directed the 
Authority; then the state government exercised its own influence. Afterwards, the ethnic 
politics of that balkanized city entangled the administrators tasked with implementation 
of the policy. Banfield bemoans the fact that building sites were chosen not for their 
amenability to the fundamental purposes for which they were built, but rather on the basis 
of whether the alderman who represented the district supported its construction (1959, 
365). Finally, a change in the political climate culminated in directives to address racial 
segregation in Chicago.  Banfield observes in frustration that “before the buildings [were] 
occupied,” the Housing Authority became “an instrument for the reform of race 
relations” (1959, p. 365).  The Authority, with scarce resources, was tasked with the 
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provision of low-income housing, slum clearance, and limiting residential segregation.  
Obviously, the most effective means to accomplish one of these goals may not work for 
the others (Banfield, 1959, p. 365). It may indeed work against the others. Furthermore, 
resource constraints may leave the Authority unable to achieve the goals simultaneously, 
even if they were complimentary. According to Banfield, the absence of rational decision 
making in public planning results in a costly trip to nowhere.  
The rational planning model attempts to bring cohesion and purpose to planning. 
Clear definition of ends and means gives focus to a plan and an evaluative measure of the 
means: do they achieve the desired ends? Furthermore, deliberate planning allows for 
comprehensiveness and the consideration of unintended consequences. Banfield insists 
that a lack of political realism is not a failing of rational planning, but rather an occasion 
to point out opportunities for greater efficiency and effectiveness (1959, 368).  
 
Figure 1 – NSP analysis using a synoptic framework.  
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The Branch The RPM requires an unrealistic knowledge and ability to foresee the 
future consequences of policy decisions. The distinction between means and ends is not 
precise in real social decision-making and the comprehensiveness required for truly 
rational policymaking is not possible (Etzioni, 1967, p. 386).  In the same year Banfield 
refined the RPM, another scholar, Charles Lindblom, proposed an alternative planning 
paradigm.  
In a pluralistic society, opposing factions frequently converge upon a consensus. That 
consensus is in a constant incremental state of flux, changing imperceptibly day-by-day, 
but unrecognizable after a century.  Lindblom calls this process of consensus building 
“mutual adjustment” and it is an essential element of incrementalism (1979, p. 522-523). 
Mutual adjustment provides a useful paradigm for policy analysis (Lindblom, 1979, p. 
524). It explains why a proposition that is mildly unpleasant to all parties is tolerable to 
the whole. The details of any single policy do not represent a total win–lose situation for 
any party to the debate (Lindblom, 1979). This situation leads to greater willingness to 
compromise during the creation of policy and greater tolerance of its politically 
unpalatable aspects during implementation. 
Lindblom posits that planners and other public managers should dispense with the 
pretense of comprehensiveness. The spectrum of alternative policies should instead be 
limited to those that are politically feasible.  Similarly, incrementalism only considers 
crucial consequences within the planner’s control. The incrementalist planner, by limiting 
the continuum of policy alternatives and consequences to her own range of efficacy, is 
able to constantly reassess and change direction (Etzioni, 1967, p.387). In this way, the 
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partisans for and against a social policy (as well as effected third-parties) go through the 
continuous process of “mutual adjustment” whereby the comprehensive policy emerges – 
and changes – from the long term evolution of its constituent parts (Lindblom, 1959, p. 
85). In “The Science of Muddling Through,” Lindblom points to  income redistribution in 
the United States to illustrate the emergence of  a general policy emerging through the 
evolution of specific policies over time (1959, p.85). The pieces of the puzzle that are 
overlooked in one part of the process become the primary focus somewhere else 
(Lindblom, 1959). 
 
 
Figure 2 - NSP analysis using an incrementalist framework 
Mixed Methods Scanning Incrementalism leaves little room to consider 
alternatives to the status quo. For this reason, Amitai Etzioni describes it as conservative 
(1967, p. 385). The shortcoming of incrementalism, according to Etzioni, is its 
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nearsightedness. While incrementalism speaks to the unworkability of the Rational 
Planning Model in real life, it tends to throw the baby out with the bath water.  
Incrementalism leaves no room for new solutions to far-reaching social problems. The 
focus on immediacy is therefore limiting according to Etzioni. In his view, decision 
making in small increments risks going nowhere, it is like a man walking in circles. 
Lindblom offered incrementalism as an alternative to unactionable rationalistic planning. 
For Etzioni, incrementalism went too far and amounted to “acting without direction” 
(Etzioni, 1967, p.388).  Moreover, Etzioni observes, mutual adjustment fails to account 
for the reality that different groups have unequal access to power. The “underprivileged 
and politically unorganized” are unable to stage a multipronged and extended effort to 
shape the evolution of policy (Etzioni, 1967, p.387).    
Etzioni posits that a third alternative is possible, mixed scanning. Etzioni joins in 
Lindblom’s rejection of the modernist project – the paradigm of methodical rationality 
within which apolitical technocrats design and implement policy in linear fashion – 
however, he stops short of Lindblom’s incrementalism. Instead, he posits that a less 
flexible paradigm of decision-making and analysis is practicable. The model consists of a 
two-level approach to gathering information (mixed-scanning), a semi-normative basis 
for evaluation, and contextualization qualified by “morphological factors”  (Etzioni, 
1967, p. 389-392).  
In the abstract, mixed scanning combines a non-comprehensive view of the macro 
environment with a detailed view of the micro level environment. Etzioni employs the 
metaphor of a weather mapping system that keeps a detailed focus on the specific service 
area, but also maintains a lower resolution view of a larger area (1967, p. 389). Since 
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1967, academics have elaborated on the theoretical model and practitioners have 
demonstrated its utility (Etzioni, 1986, p. 8). In 1986 Etzioni revisited mixed scanning in 
an aptly titled article “Mixed Scanning Revisited.” Again, Etzioni provides instances of 
mixed scanning. Two notable examples include a reference to U.S. Cold War foreign 
policy, and a description of an early computerized geographic information system called 
Decision Information Discipline System (DIDS). The macro level decision to contain the 
expansion of Soviet influence immediately after World War II became the overriding 
principle that guided micro level incremental decisions for several decades. Without 
reference to the larger more comprehensive decision (containment) the incremental 
decisions (preemptive intervention in unaligned countries) would not make sense 
(Etzioni, 1986, p. 8). In the case of the DIDs, a regional level analysis confirmed a 
general trend in population growth, while a focused micro level trend revealed 
aberrations correlated to incremental policy decisions (Etzioni, 1986, p. 8-9).  
In the 1967 article, Etzioni articulated an evaluative framework to assess policy 
implementation. First, define the primary goal of the policy (Etzioni, 1967, p. 387-390). 
If multiple goals are implied, decide by rank order. In the case that there are two or more 
major policy goals (Etzioni uses the example of a teaching hospital with equal mission to 
teach, research, and treat patients), the analyst will consider the extent to which the policy 
achieves each goal (Etzioni, 1967, p. 390). In such cases the analyst may additionally rely 
upon informal ranking processes (Etzioni suggests, for instance, that professors may 
value research over teaching). Decide whether the implementation is realizing the goal(s). 
If the current implementation meets this evaluative benchmark, the policy is good 
(Etzioni, 1967, p. 390). All the while, the analyst should note the policy’s effect on 
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secondary goals. This process of “zooming out” to see whether the implementation is 
leading in the general direction of the policy goal, gives purpose to incremental street-
level decisions.  
It is easy to see how such an evaluative framework mediates between rationalism 
and incrementalism. The framework provides a degree of comprehensiveness and 
linearity, but only after the goals have been defined by a consensus grounded in political 
reality. The evaluative criteria is not whether a grand plan has been achieved, but whether 
the incremental steps of planners and other actors comport with a policy’s stated goal. In 
effect, it gives existential meaning to the work of the incrementalist planner.  
 The dichotomy implies a deeper philosophical question about democratic 
legitimacy: whether planners and public managers should row or steer the “ship of the 
state” (Holzer, 2004, p.53). On the part of Lindblom and his intellectual heirs, it is also a 
matter of efficacy couched in the straightforward observation that in a liberal-state, 
private-sector managers have much greater control over the inputs of production than 
planners (Holzer, 2004, p. 53). Ironically, the synoptic-rationalist disregards this reality in 
pursuit of comprehensiveness. The disconnect results in plans that stand as aspirational 
civic statements never to be actualized (Long, 1959).   
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Figure 3 - NSP analysis using mixed-scanning techniques. The primary focus is on micro level implementation, 
the macro level should be obscured, however, for formatting purposes it is not possible to express that here.   
 
Application to Federal Housing Policy Federal policy is inconsistent. In 
“Swimming against the Tide” Alice O’Connor provides an exhaustive history of federal 
policy in poor communities (1999). Nonetheless, O’Connor’s observations and analysis 
of community level federal policy interventions can be generalized to communities that 
are not necessarily poor. Writing in the late 1990s, O’Connor saw the tide of federal 
policy as consistently receding from poor communities, especially racially defined urban 
neighborhoods. From O’Connor’s point of view, the high tide of federal policy was 
passage of the Great Society programs during the Johnson administration. Even during 
the 1960’s however, policy goals were obfuscated in the implementation process 
(O’Connor, 1999). Changes in the national political climate reshaped the goals of federal 
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programs even as they were implemented.  As the tide turned and fiscal conservatism 
drove federal policy, funding was in a constant state of flux leaving administrators and 
beneficiaries in a state of perpetual uncertainty. The result is that it is nearly impossible to 
analyze the effectiveness or best practices of a single poverty intervention, because its 
purpose and procedures, even its very existence, is likely to change.  
The tide has shifted again. Since 2008, the federal government has taken a role in 
regulating markets and investing in communities that would have seemed impossible just 
a few years ago. The NSP is a product of this process.  Each of the three versions of the 
program was created as part of a larger legislative package. Each program was enacted to 
achieve different ends and permitted local governments to use different means.  
The overall goals of federal policy have shifted wildly since NSP1 was enacted in 
2008. Unless there is a fourth round of NSP funding, the NSP is a one-off event that does 
not fit into any cohesive community development policy.  Consequently, examining the 
effectiveness of NSP grantees is complicated by the differing goals and means of each 
NSP, as well as the lack of a single overriding national goal.  
Neighborhood Stabilization Analysis of the NSP should proceed using mixed-
scanning. The advantage of mixed-scanning is that it takes on the realism and flexibility 
of incrementalism without abandoning the rational grounding of the rational planning 
model. In this way, the research can focus on street level adjustments in ends and means 
within local community development agencies. This level of analysis matches the high 
resolution local weather satellite in Etzioni’s illustration. The community level 
implementation of the NSP will uncover the process of “muddling through” local social 
and political realities.  
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At the same time, researcher can retain some sense of the program’s technical 
purpose: to mitigate the contagion effect of foreclosure and stop neighborhood 
deterioration. This broader level of analysis is akin to the low-resolution wide-view lens. 
However these concepts are operationalized, the two-level approach allows for a 
comprehensive, yet focused inquiry. It also allows for a falsifiable conclusion that the 
program has or has not achieved a normative goal. 
The stated goal of NSP is to stabilize “communities that have suffered from 
foreclosures and abandonment [through] the purchase and redevelopment of foreclosed 
and abandoned homes and residential properties” (U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, 2010). Furthermore, congress indicated that 25% of every grant 
should benefit households earning less than 50% of Area Median Income (AMI) and that 
all funds should benefit households earning less than 120% of AMI. Local administrative 
costs should not exceed 10% of the grant amount.  Congress directed HUD to allocate the 
funds according to particular criteria, but left wide latitude for counties and 
municipalities to determine the particular means of fulfilling the mandate (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2008).  
Within the mixed scanning framework, the success of NSP implementation will 
be gauged by how well the incremental responses to real-world social and political 
conditions accomplish the stated national goal. Accomplishing the goal is not a matter of 
hard metrics, like the number of families housed or vacant properties demolished.  
Instead, success is a question of how well the outcome resembles the image of the 
overriding principle of “neighborhood stabilization” situated in the particular context of a 
specific neighborhood. For instance, in one community the demolition of vacant housing 
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and reduction of density may result in successful stabilization.  In another community the 
construction of new multi-family housing and an increase of density may be the measure 
of success. In yet another neighborhood simply performing long-deferred maintenance 
and reselling a few homes at market value will accomplish stabilization. The next chapter 
examines the incremental tools used by NSP grantees throughout the state of Florida to 
achieve the congressional mandate to stabilize distressed neighborhoods. The chapters 
that follow afterwards examine the outcomes of three specific jurisdictions.   
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Chapter 4: Implementation of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program in Florida 
Florida is a primary recipient of NSP funds. This is largely attributable to the fact 
that the foreclosure crisis severely affected the state. As a result, federal policies designed 
to address neighborhood level problems of foreclosure have disproportionately benefited 
Florida. The state accounts for 49 of the 307 local governments nationwide awarded NSP 
1 funds, and 13.81% of all funds expended by the end of the third quarter of 2011 (U.S. 
Department of Housing & Urban Development, 2011). As a result, Florida is a great 
place to examine NSP implementation. 
Program Constraints The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
administers the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, 2010b). Grantees are given wide latitude to devise innovative ways to 
spend the money. Nonetheless, there are several key limitations. For example, no grantee 
can spend more than 10% of its NSP funds on program administration (Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2010). Additionally, demolition cannot exceed 10% of 
the budget (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). Although blight 
clearance is not an approved use of NSP funds unless it furthers the goal of mitigating the 
effect of foreclosure, any properties to be demolished must be blighted. Consequently, 
counties and municipalities must give a definition of the term blight when applying for an 
NSP grant. This prevents the use of NSP funds to supplement local slum and blight 
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removal activities unrelated to foreclosure. It also prevent the destruction of useable 
housing stock.  
Grantees must also comply with the vicinity hiring requirement in place for all 
CDBG funds (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2011). This condition, 
“to the maximum extent feasible, provide for the hiring of employees who reside in the 
vicinity,” is the primary economic development tool of the NSP (Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2011). Grantees must also make reasonable provision for 
environmentally friendly and energy efficient building practices (Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2010). In addition, NSP recipients must make an effort to 
gather citizen input when drafting their action plans. The core allocation requirement is 
that benefits of the program must flow to a particular range of income classes.  
The provision of low-income housing is one of the national objectives of the NSP. 
Every grantee must set aside 25% of its total funding for families at or below 50% of the 
median household income (AMI) (Kirwin Institute , 2010). Many Florida grantees are 
eager to use existing homebuyer assistance programs to implement NSP. Consequently, 
the focus is often on homeownership rather than rental properties. The result is that most 
of the action plans submitted by Florida counties and cities – and approved by HUD – 
include plans to expand homeownership for families earning less than 50% of AMI.  The 
25% requirement produces a very low income-ceiling. For example, a one person 
household in Sarasota County can earn no more than $21,780. Sarasota County has 
developed a novel solution to this challenge by drastically reducing the cost of housing 
(see discussion of affordability below). Most grantees, however, simply state their 
intention to provide down-payment assistance and sell renovated homes to households 
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below the low-income ceiling. The families must qualify for a market rate purchase 
money loan. The remaining 65% of funds can be used for low, moderate, and middle 
income households: families who earn less than 120% of AMI.  
Allowable Uses Allowable expenses under NSP fall into eight broad categories; 
1) acquisition, 2) clearance, 3) homeownership, 4) land banking, 5) public facilities & 
economic development, 6) residential new construction, 7) residential rehab, and 8) 
administrative costs. Funds must be obligated within 18 months of action plan approval 
by HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010). All of NSP1 
funds must be spent within four years (Kirwin Institute , 2010; U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2010). As a result, the majority of NSP 1 programs 
funds awarded to Florida grantees will be spent by the end of 2013. In reality, most have 
already been expended as of February 2012 or continued through subsequent NSP2 and 
NSP3 grants.  
Municipalities may choose to acquire properties and place them in a land bank for 
up to ten years while they maintain the property and clear it of blight conditions 
(Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2010b). Nonetheless, any property 
acquired with NSP funds and placed in a land bank must ultimately be used for an NSP 
eligible purpose.  As mentioned before, clearance cannot exceed 10% of an NSP grant 
(many Rustbelt cities have used the funds to supplement larger efforts to reduce density 
in residential neighborhoods). Throughout the nation – as shown in the chart below – 
residential rehab is the most popular use of NSP funds.  
Affordability Affordability is one of the goals of the neighborhood stabilization 
program.  Communities in Florida have adopted a variety of techniques to ensure that low 
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to middle-income households can continue to benefit from the government’s investment 
in housing for years to come. One such tool is the Land Use Restriction Agreement 
(LURA). Another is the Community Land Trust (CLT).  Perhaps the most common is the 
“soft mortgage.” Another popular tool is the Shared Appreciation Mortgage (SAM). 
A LURA is a contractual restriction on the use of a particular piece of real 
property. A few Florida NSP grantees are using LURAs to ensure the long-term 
affordability of rental housing. In this way a municipality can purchase and rehabilitate 
multi-family housing and sell it to a private entity. The LURA imposes income 
qualifications on the new landlord’s tenants and a formula for determining a fair rent. In 
some cases, LURAs are also being used to ensure that a homebuyer remains an owner 
occupant for several years, thereby stabilizing the neighborhood (Town of Davie Housing 
and Community Development, 2010).  
Community Land Trusts are a means of keeping property perpetually affordable. 
A land trust – also known as a Community Housing trust (CHT) – resembles a housing 
cooperative corporation (Co-op) in that ownership of land resides in an independent 
entity, generally a non-profit corporation. The land trust continues to own the land, and 
sells the structures that sit upon it to homebuyers, with a ‘perpetual’ lease. Conceptually, 
this keeps the property affordable, as the homebuyer does not own the underlying land. In 
the case of single-family detached housing, the land can represent 30% or more of the 
sale price.  Limiting the market purchase price to only the improvements drastically 
reduces the cost of purchasing a home.  
Community Land Trusts with provisions that ensure continued affordability are 
somewhat more complicated. Generally, these take the form of deed restrictions. The 
 41 
 
homebuyers must be of low to moderate income, usually defined by reference to AMI. 
Usually the maximum income falls somewhere between 80% and 120% of AMI. In 
addition, the CLT limits the amount of positive equity a homeowner can realize from the 
property. Sometimes this is an outright cap of resale price. Other times the CLT requires 
any amount above a predetermined amount to be shared with the CLT to expand and 
support its efforts. 
The Sarasota Community Housing Trust (SCHT) predates NSP. However, 
funding from NSP is transforming the entity. The SCHT is quite flexible and allows the 
trust to sell the land after twenty years (Sarasota Office of Housing and Community 
Development, 2011). Conceptually this prevents a short-term solution to affordability 
from causing long-term problems of alienability. It also focuses its efforts on households 
earning less than 100% of AMI. A few properties are restricted to households earning 
less than 80% of AMI. Properties enter the trust as qualified families elect to use NSP 
funds to purchase a distressed home and offer the underlying land to the SCHT. The 
Sarasota Office of Housing and Community Development then subsidizes the purchase 
using NSP funds. If the trust later sells the property back into the unrestricted market, the 
Trust can elect to either a) repay the subsidy with interest; or b) use the proceeds to 
purchase additional affordable housing (Sarasota Office of Housing and Community 
Development, 2011). 
A soft second mortgage is a blanket term. Generally, it refers to a loan with 
delayed repayment and minimal interest (Benjamin, Rubin, & Zielenbach, 2004). Soft 
seconds are usually part of down payment assistance programs for first time homebuyers 
(Benjamin, Rubin, & Zielenbach, 2004). The loans often cover not only the down 
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payment, but also closing costs allowing households of limited means to become 
homeowners. Many Florida NSP grantees are ensuring affordability through soft second 
mortgages. The loans are arranged through the HOME down payment assistance 
program. Low-income homebuyers must attend a HUD approved class covering topics 
such as homeownership, credit worthiness, and real estate transactions. They must also 
qualify for a conventional mortgage. The city or county will then sell them a home 
acquired and renovated using NSP funds. In many cases the buyer will never have to 
make payments on the second mortgage. If they do, repayment is structured to be 
affordable.  
A SAM is a mortgage-secured purchase money loan structured more like an 
equity investment than a debt instrument (Caplin et al, 2008). The homebuyer exchanges 
the mortgage for use of public (or publicly guaranteed) money. The mortgagee is either 
the municipality or a financial institution that works closely with local housing officials. 
The borrower must repay the principle and a portion of the appreciation on the property 
upon sale or discharge of the primary mortgage (Caplin, 2007). The appreciation is based 
upon the amount of the original purchase price subsidized by local government. The 
proceeds are used to discount the purchase price to the next buyer, thus ensuring long-
term affordability even if the home is priced in an inflating real estate market (Caplin et 
al, 2008).  
The affordability requirement creates a short-term technical and ethical challenge, 
as well as a long term opportunity to provide affordable housing. There is a tension 
between the competing programmatic goals of price stabilization in middle-income 
neighborhoods on the one hand, and provision of housing options for low-income 
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households on the other hand. Grantees are faced with a choice of working against the 
overall imperative of the NSP – containing the contagion effects of  foreclosure – or 
confirming price declines by placing units in the low-income market. As mentioned 
above, Sarasota County has chosen to do this by removing land-value from market 
valuation through a community land trust. This provides a permanent supply of low-
income housing but undermines the character of the neighborhood. Alternatively, 
grantees can take the path of least resistance and further the spatial concentration of 
poverty by targeting all low-income housing funds to existing low-income 
neighborhoods. Marion County, discussed in Chapter Seven, has chosen this practice.  
The county purchased and renovated rental properties in West Ocala, a neighborhood 
already defined by concentrated poverty. The housing is only available to households 
earning less than 50% of AMI. The resale and rental of properties acquired through NSP 
generates income for local governments. Grantees may use program income to continue 
funding activities that serve the housing needs of households earning less than 50% of 
AMI. In this way communities that are NSP grantees benefit from a legacy funding 
mechanism.  
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Chapter 5: Methods 
 This research employs mixed quantitative and qualitative methods. Conceptually 
the benefit of this approach is that it enjoys the flexibility and context of descriptive data 
and personal observation couched in a firm quantitative metric. Unfortunately, as will be 
shown, the results of the quantitative analysis imply that the contagion effect upon which 
this research is premised may not be as predictable or universal as the literature suggests. 
At the very least the neighborhoods examined here may not be representative of the 
general trend throughout Florida and the United States.  
 This chapter broadly outlines the research design. The research question and the 
working hypothesis are stated below. In the course of research operationalizing 
foreclosure proved to be a more difficult task than expected. This chapter includes a brief 
discussion of two measures researchers can use to count foreclosure in Florida. It is a 
challenging issue and draws into question the statements of researchers, public officials, 
and journalists claiming that a certain number or rate of foreclosures exists within any 
given geography. Moreover, any statement that foreclosure correlates with any other 
phenomenon is a dubious claim without a succinct statement of what exactly the word 
foreclosure means.   
 After the section defining foreclosure, this chapter introduces the study area. 
There are a total of ten neighborhoods examined here. The neighborhoods are located in 
three different counties each representative of a different region of the state. Six of these 
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neighborhoods are treated in the quantitative analysis; all of them are included in the 
qualitative study. Finally, the data sources are identified. The methods with which the 
data were treated are briefly introduced. The quantitative methods used in this research 
are most easily discussed with real examples to illustrate the relationship between 
appraised values of properties in close proximity to one another. As a result, in depth 
discussion of the quantitative methodology is found in Chapter Six.    
Research Question Has the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) 
effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure in select Florida census 
tracts as measured by home values and other metrics of neighborhood wellbeing?  
 Working Hypothesis (1) The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) 
has effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure as measured by home 
values. (2) Because the NSP involves government intervention as a market 
participant, there will be little or no discernible effect of neighborhood wellbeing 
as measured by personal observation and public records. 
 Defining Foreclosure A persistent challenge for researchers has been to 
define and identify distressed properties. In Florida, when a mortgagee begins to 
foreclose upon its lien as a result of non-payment by the mortgagor, a lis pendens  
is recorded with the clerk of court to put interested parties on notice that there is 
pending legal action associated with the property. Recording the lis pendens 
indicates that the property has entered the foreclosure process. However, the mere 
filing of a lis pendens does not tell the whole story.  
 Very often the foreclosure process is stalled or avoided. This can happen 
for a number of reasons, the parties can reach an agreement to modify the 
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mortgage, the case be dismissed for procedural reasons; the property owner can 
sell the property; the parties can agree to a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure; or the 
plaintiff-mortgagee can allow the mortgagor to pay its arrearage and resume 
payment on the associated note, or simply abandon its claim altogether. 
Consequently, researchers examining the impacts of foreclosure cannot simply 
rely on lis pendens to identify foreclosed homes.  
 At the end of a foreclosure process, after a judgment is entered and the 
debtor’s right to redemption has expired, a court ordered sale of the property will 
take place. The foreclosing lien holder can bid up to the amount that it is owed 
and take possession of the property; or, if another party bids a greater amount the 
purchaser takes possession and the proceeds are applied to satisfy the lien-holder. 
In either scenario, title is conveyed by a certificate of title which is duly recorded 
by the clerk of court. Therefore, a search of public records for certificates of title 
associated with foreclosure actions will indicate properties that actually went all 
the way through the foreclosure process.  
 Researchers are faced with a decision point, whether to focus on 
foreclosed homes, or distressed homes.  The mere filing of a lis pendens indicates 
default on a loan and financial trouble. Even in situations where there is a sale, 
loan modification, or deed-in-lieu that prevents forcible dispossession of the 
owners, there may be abandonment or lack of upkeep that impacts the 
neighborhood and exacerbates property value declines.  On the other hand, in 
spite of the historic high in foreclosure, actual forced sales remain rare, the 
neighborhood impacts on home values and the implications for the larger 
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economy are much more severe when parties complete the foreclosure process 
and a lien-holder must take possession, manage, and market a property in order to 
recover its investment. Real Estate Owned (REO) consistently sells for less than 
non-REO property, primarily because banks lack the expertise and local 
knowledge to market property and prefer liquid funds to holding a portfolio of 
real property (Pennington-Cross, 2006, p. 211-212). In the current market, sales 
by owners before the foreclosure process is complete are often “short-sales,” that 
is a sale approved by the lien-holder for less than is owed. Research indicates that 
lien holders lose 50% of their investment from REO, compared to as little as 34% 
from short-sales (Pennington-Cross, 2010).  
 In either event, the properties will be used as comparables to appraise 
future sale prices of similar nearby properties. The measurable consequences for 
neighborhoods where multiple foreclosures have occurred are much greater than 
neighborhoods that merely have many distressed properties.  
 The formula for allocating NSP dollars relies on lis pendens and technical 
defaults. Therefore, I follow that pattern of focusing on distressed rather than 
foreclosed properties. Nonetheless, it is important to note that a neighborhood 
could have had many distressed properties in mid-2009 that never actually 
completed the foreclosure process. This is especially true in areas affected by the 
loss of employment in the building trades and automatic adjustments in variable-
rate-mortgages. In these areas the market may self-correct without undermining 
neighborhood integrity, though it may be painful for individual households.  In 
other neighborhoods, especially those defined by historic racial exclusion (e.g. 
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West Ocala) or persistent disinvestment and class stratification (e.g. Central 
Rockledge) the recent financial crisis can have devastating neighborhood effects.  
Therefore, in the qualitative section of this research I consider concentrations of 
homes that have actually gone through the foreclosure process.   
 Study Area Country Club Estates is a neighborhood in the city of 
Rockledge. Brevard County used NSP funds to stabilize the neighborhood. 
Central Rockledge is another neighborhood in the City of Rockledge. Brevard 
County did not target the neighborhood for stabilization with NSP funds. 
 Rainbow Park is a failed development in rural Marion County. The 
County used NSP funds to purchase properties in the development. West Ocala is 
an urban neighborhood in the City of Ocala. Marion County selected the 
neighborhood to receive NSP intervention. Marion Oaks is a master planned 
community in unincorporated Marion County. The community is located south of 
Ocala near the Sumter County border. Marion County targeted a large portion of 
its NSP grant to Marion Oaks. Silver Springs Shores is a housing development in 
eastern Marion County near the Ocala National Forest. The neighborhood also 
received a large share of the County’s NSP funds. Turning Point is the largest 
housing development in the census tracts east and north of Marion Oaks. The area 
did not receive NSP funds.  
 Naples Park is a neighborhood in Collier County north of Naples. 
Although the neighborhood has experienced a high rate of foreclosure, Collier 
County did not spend NSP funds in the community. Golden Gate City is a 
neighborhood in unincorporated Collier County. It is east of Naples. The 
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neighborhood received substantial investment through the NSP. Golden Gate 
Estates is north and east of Golden Gate City. It too received significant 
investment through the Collier County NSP.  
 
Table 1- Neighborhoods in Quantitative & Qualitative Sections 
Neighborhoods Discussed in Quantitative & Qualitative Sections 
Jurisdiction NSP Neighborhood Tract Non-NSP  Tract 
Marion  Marion Oak 0010.02 Turning Point 0009.01 
Collier Golden Gate Estates 0112.02 Naples Park 0101.04 
Brevard-Rockledge Country Club Estates 0629 Central Rockledge 0631.01 
 
Table 2 -Neighborhoods only in Qualitative Section 
Neighborhoods Discussed only in Qualitative Section  
Jurisdiction NSP Neighborhood Census Tract 
Marion  West Ocala 0017, 0018 
 Rainbow Park 0026.01 
 Silver Springs 
Shores  
0012.04 
Collier Golden Gate City 0104.09,  
0104.11 
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Figure 4 - Country Club Estates 
 
Figure 5 - Central Rockledge 
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Figure 6 - West Ocala 
 
Figure 7 - Rainbow Park 
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Figure 8 - Marion Oaks 
 
Figure 9 - Naples Park 
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Figure 10 - Golden Gate City 
 
Figure 11 - Golden Gate Estates 
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Figure 12 - Silver Springs Shores 
 
Methodology and Procedure 
Quantitative Sources of Data  
 Property Appraiser Data In the course of this research I relied heavily on the 
online databases maintained by the elected property appraisers of Brevard, Collier, and 
Marion counties. In particular, I used these sources for information about assessed 
property values, ownership information, the years that improvements were built, and 
parcel identification numbers. Some of the property appraisers in Florida maintain very 
user-friendly online databases with GIS mapping, assessments from multiple years, and 
links to Tax Collector TRIM notices, code enforcement documents, building sketches, 
and clerk of court conveyance documents. Some even allow the user to identify the same 
information for nearby parcels with a single mouse-click. Unfortunately, none of the 
counties in the study areas are this user-friendly. Gathering information about the parcels 
required consultation of other public records.  
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 Tax Collector In addition to property appraiser data, I consulted the databases 
maintained by the elected tax collectors for each of the three jurisdictions. Tax collector 
data was particularly useful for determining past appraisal values for properties in 
Rockledge.  
 Clerk of Court The clerk of court for each of the 67 counties in Florida maintains 
a public record of documents relating to interests in real property. I consulted these 
records to identify distressed properties. As mentioned below, I also used public records 
to uncover trends within neighborhoods relating to code violations.  
Qualitative Data Sources 
Professional Literature In 2010, the Kiriwin Institute analyzed the 
implementation of NSP 1 and 2 in Florida. The Institute’s efforts culminated in 
‘Recovering from Crisis, A Review of Neighborhood Stabilization in Florida’s Economic 
Recovery.” To date it is the only comprehensive scholarly examination of the NSP 
program in Florida that focuses on technical implementation. Although the emphasis of 
that work was economic stimulus and racial access to housing, its procedural framework 
and methodology were a major influence on this research. Additionally, I consulted a 
2006 HUD publication for practitioners entitled “Best Practices for Effecting the 
Rehabilitation of Affordable Housing.” The HUD document identified important sources 
and an approach to information necessary to examine housing policies.  
NSP Resource Exchange The primary source of substantive information for this 
research is HUD’s NSP Resource Exchange website. The site is an invaluable resource 
for anyone interested in the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. It contains all of the 
governing documents for all three NSP programs.  
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Action Plans and Quarterly Reports In addition to general information 
about the NSP, the Resource Exchange includes downloadable action plans, 
amended action plans, and quarterly reports from every grantee in the country. 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development provides “snapshots” and 
summary reports about the program generally, and the performance of specific 
grantees.  
Online Mapping Application The Resource Exchange includes an 
interactive mapping tool with tract scores and the component statistics that are 
used in the greatest-need-formula. Additionally, there is raw data available for 
download that can be manipulated using geographic information systems (GIS) or 
statistical analysis software. The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) also maintains hyperlinks to multimedia collections located at YouTube 
and Flickr. A wealth of material related to best practices is available on the 
Resource Exchange in the form of webinars, training manuals, white papers, and 
scholarly articles.  
Electronic Sources and Grantee Documents I also utilized information 
maintained by the grantees themselves. Often, these resources included information about 
internal decision making processes (e.g. promotional materials, maps, neighborhood 
descriptions). This information was supplemented by real estate listings, county tax 
collector  databases, county property appraiser databases, and public records maintained 
by county clerks of court.  
Code Enforcement Collier County maintains a searchable database of code 
enforcement actions accessible to the public via the internet. The database is accessible at 
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the Collier County Growth Management Division – Planning and Regulation website 
(Collier County, 2012). I searched the Collier County code enforcement database for 
parcel IDs of distressed properties. I then searched for addresses on the same street to 
determine if the presence of distressed properties created conditions that led to more 
frequent citations.  
The city of Rockledge does not maintain a similar database. It does, however, file 
liens against properties with unpaid fines. Rockledge also takes a lien against properties 
that have been abandoned. The City must secure the property and cut the grass and uses a 
lien against title to ensure that the city will someday be reimbursed for the expense. Code 
enforcement liens are recorded with the clerk of court and can be found through a search 
of public records. I searched Brevard County public records for liens where the city was 
named as a party within the relevant range of dates and a partial legal description of a 
known distressed property. The results roughly approximated neighborhoods because the 
properties shared section and subdivision information. Brevard County public records are 
accessible at the Brevard Clerk of Court website (Brevard Clerk of Court, 2012).  I used 
the same technique in Marion County searching for instances when Marion County Code 
Enforcement was the listed lien holder. Marion County official records are accessible at 
the Marion County Clerk of Court website (Marion County Clerk of Court, 2012).  
Crime Information about crime was collected from a number of sources. For 
crime in Marion County I consulted the archives of the Ocala Star-Banner “police and 
community briefs,” a section in the daily paper that reports recent arrests and criminal 
incidents (Ocala Star-Banner, 2012). The Collier County Sherriff’s Department maintains 
an interactive crime map that displays the type and location of crime along with the day 
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and time a deputy arrived. In addition, the crime map indicates the reason a deputy 
responded, whether there was an anonymous tip or a call for service (Collier County 
Sheriff's Department, 2012). Unfortunately, neither the Rockledge Police Department, 
nor the Brevard County Sheriff’s department maintains a searchable database of crime 
that associates incidents with specific addresses. The only data available are annual 
statistics about Rockledge as whole.   
Education Information about school performance came from the Florida 
Department of Education (FLDOE) 2010-2011 school accountability report. The report is 
available for download in excel format at the FLDOE website (Florida Department of 
Education , 2011). Additionally, information about which schools in the FLDOE report 
serve each neighborhood came from the school board websites of Brevard, Collier, and 
Marion.  
Google Alerts Knowing that the large-scale investment of federal funds is 
contentious and noteworthy, I expected local news outlets to report on the NSP resource 
allocation and policy implementation. Accordingly, I used a Google alert with the 
keywords “NSP,” and “Florida” from mid-August 2011 to the present. From the results, I 
was able to create a small bank of local newspaper, public radio, and television news 
articles related to the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. This information proved to be 
an invaluable insight into local opposition to some NSP activity, corruption in the 
implementation of NSP 1, and the comments of local officials to journalists that cannot 
be found in official action plans and quarterly reports.  
Direct Observations I personally visited each of the neighborhoods examined in 
this research.  During the visits I walked the neighborhood and observed the housing 
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stock and the state of the neighborhood. In the NSP neighborhoods I visited homes 
purchased and renovated through the program as well as neighboring properties. Upon 
arriving in a neighborhood I located a home I knew to be distressed. I observed the 
distressed home and its neighbors and began to walk as much of the neighborhood as 
possible using the distressed properties as a starting point. Specifically, I looked for 
indicators of neighborhood decline such as unkempt lawns, visible disrepair, signs of 
vandalism or graffiti, vacant homes, heaps of refuse, and signs indicating that homes 
were being sold at a discount (e.g. “short sale”). In addition, I looked for signs of 
neighborhood vitality, such as residents socializing with each other, well maintained 
properties, indications of neighborhood organization, and signs and advertisements 
emphasizing the construction quality and location of available properties rather than their 
bargain prices. I visited Marion County on January 6
th
 and 7
th
 of 2012; Collier County on 
January 20
th
; and Rockledge on February 4
th
.  
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Chapter 6: The effect of NSP expenditure on home values 
This Chapter begins by further elaborating on the methodology introduced in 
Chapter Five. Then the observations are presented for three neighborhoods receiving NSP 
funds, and three similar neighborhoods not receiving NSP funds. In each neighborhood, 
distressed and non-distressed homes are identified. First, the baseline pre-crisis average 
value for each home is identified. Then, the relationship between the appraised values of 
the distressed properties and appraised values of the non-distressed properties is 
measured using the mean ratio of difference of intrinsic value. Post crisis observations are 
taken on the same property using 2011 appraisals. These data are then treated with 
regression analysis using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. 
The results indicate that the limited sample is not statistically significant, implying that 
the findings within the sampled neighborhoods may not reflect the general trend in the 
entire universe of NSP neighborhoods. Within the examined neighborhoods, there is no 
clear relationship between NSP spending and losses of intrinsic homes values. Moreover, 
the descriptive data imply that there may not even be a deleterious contagion effect of 
foreclosure measurable as a decline in appraised property values. In at least two of the 
neighborhoods examined here, non-distressed home owners actually experienced 
increases in relative value when their neighbors experienced foreclosure. 
Foreclosure causes a decline in value to nearby properties. The following 
hypothetical situation illustrates how the contagion effect of foreclosure can be measured 
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by comparing the appraised values of neighboring properties. The property located at 123 
Elm Street is valued at $200,000. Down the street, the house at 129 Elm Street is valued 
at $220,000. Although the values rise and fall according to market trends, the difference 
in value between the two homes remains fairly constant, all else being equal. In other 
words, the difference in intrinsic value between the two homes is 10%.  
Unfortunately, local real estate values fall by fifty percent. The family living at 
129 Elm Street – in every other way equal to the family down the street – is $10,000 
richer than the neighbors.  All this changes when the family at 123 Elm Street 
experiences a foreclosure. Six months after the foreclosure, the home sells for $90,000. 
The foreclosure has several negative externalities. Taken together these spillover effects 
constitute the contagion effect of foreclosure. Among these is the loss of wealth in the 
form of home equity held by middle class families. All else being equal, the historic trend 
would indicate that the home at 129 Elm Street will appraise for 110% of the appraised 
value of 123 Elm, $99,000. In reality, however, the home is likely to appraise for 105% 
of the neighboring value the year after the sale and 102% or less the year after. If, thirty 
months after the foreclosure, 123 Elm appraises for $85,000, 129 Elm is likely to 
appraise for $86,700 instead of $93,500. In other words, the household at 129 Elm is 
$6,800 less wealthy because of the nearby foreclosure. This effect is amplified by the 
overlapping effects of concentrated foreclosures that characterizes the current crisis, and 
exacerbated by the other negative indicators or neighborhood wellbeing associated with 
foreclosure. The cumulative effect is a massive loss of wealth to middle class families.  
The federal government enacted the NSP, in part to contain this evaporation of 
home values. The quantitative element of this research attempted to measure how 
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effectively the NSP mitigated the erosion of neighboring home values. The steps of this 
process are explained below.  
Pre-crisis 
 Property and Baseline Identified The first step to prepare for the 
analysis was to isolate distressed properties, and nearby non-distressed properties. This 
was done by identifying the lis pendens filed in each tract between 2007 and 2009, and 
choosing its closest non-distressed neighbor. This was complicated by the fact that in 
every neighborhood examined in this research distressed homes were clustered together. 
Consequently the housing pairs are as close together as possible, although many are on 
different streets. 
 Once the properties were identified I established a baseline difference in value. 
Using county property appraiser valuations for the years 2000-2006 I determined the 
consistent difference in value between the paired homes. The mean ratios of difference of 
intrinsic value (MDIV) were determined by 1) averaging the appraised values of  each for 
the three years; and then 2) dividing the  three-year-average appraised value of the non-
distressed home by the appraised value of the distressed home. This ratio should reflect 
the intrinsic difference in value between the two properties assuming there are no major 
improvements and there is normal depreciation.  
 
Mean Ratios of Difference of Intrinsic Value In the Collier County NSP 
census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period of 2000-2006 was 1.1 
([.88+1.06+1.16+1.27+1.13+1.48+1.31+1.07+.995+1.15+.98+1.07.5+.998]/13=1.
12221). In the non-NSP census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period of 2000-
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2006 was 0.92 ([.89+.76+1.25+1.23+.64+1.08+.93+.58+.87+ 
.996]/10=0.922908078).  
In the Marion County NSP census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period 
of 2000-2006 was 1.24 ([1.06+1.998+.82+1.37+.76+1.20+2.49+.85+1.13+.77]/10 
=1.244419469). In the non-NSP census tracts the baseline MRDIV for the period 
of 2000-2006 was 1.26 ([1.16+1.43+.96+1.21+.93+1.86]/6=1.258002955).  
In the Rockledge NSP census tract the baseline MRDIV for the period of 
2000-2006 was approximately 1.03 ([1.12+.90+.88+1.41+1.83+.52+ 
1.28+.81+.66+.84]/10=1.025029944). In the non-NSP census tract the baseline 
MRDIV for the period of 2000-2006 was 0.94 ([.35+.75+.60+1.64+2.20+.61+ 
.85+.41+.94+1.04]/10=0.940062313).  
 
Table 3 - Collier NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Collier NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Distressed Non-Distressed 2000-2006 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
50,050 44,492  (88)  88% 
43,700 46,392 (1.06) 106% 
43,700 50,825 (116) 116% 
44,492 56,683 (127) 127% 
53,042 60,060 (113) 113% 
55,575 82,444 (148) 148% 
49,940 65,400 (131) 131% 
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96,388 103,494 (107) 107% 
143,299 142,602 (99.5) 100% 
140,396 161,235 (115) 115% 
186,269 183,432 (98) 98% 
178,189 191,558 
(107.5) 
108% 
18,525 18,500 (99.8) 100% 
 
Table 4 - Collier Non-NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Collier Non-NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2000-2006 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
184,998 164,005 (89) 89% 
166,581 126,104 (76) 76% 
136,152 170,351 (125) 125% 
153,788 189,814  (123) 123% 
318,475 203,120  (64) 64% 
205,748 222,370 (108) 108% 
194,280 181,584  (93) 93% 
303,790 176,104  (58) 58% 
176,712 153,826 (87) 87% 
184,998 184,391 (99.6) 100% 
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Table 5 - Marion NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Marion NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2000-2006 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
59509 63205 (106) 106% 
29563 59074 (199.8) 200% 
63495 51843 (82) 82% 
63495 86706 (137) 137% 
72349 54797 (76) 76% 
47462 57089 (120) 120% 
42528 106024 (249) 249% 
58750 49981 (85) 85% 
48220 54581 (113) 113% 
91651 70194 (77)  77% 
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Table 6  - Marion Non-NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Marion Non-NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2000-2006 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
78642 91331 (116) 116% 
85527 122723 (143) 143% 
68234 65169 (96) 96% 
66344 80031 (121) 121% 
66765 62328 (93) 93% 
136469 253399 (186)  186% 
 
Table 7 - Rockledge NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Rockledge NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2000-2006 average % of Distressed neighbor 
73517 82240 (112) 112% 
100990 91333 (90) 90% 
117583 103080 (88) 88% 
77463 109330 (141) 141% 
66927 122317 (183) 183% 
102313 53470 (52) 52% 
81740 104560 (128) 128% 
60793 49237 (81) 81% 
105023 69033 (66) 66% 
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131683 110957 (84) 84% 
 
 
 
 
Table 8  - Rockledge Non-NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Rockledge Non-NSP Tract  2000-2006 Average Value 
Distressed Non-
Distressed  
2000-2006 average % of Distressed neighbor 
62617 21713 (35) 35% 
67257 50340 (75) 75% 
99763 59657 (60) 60% 
45770 75203 (164) 164% 
55860 123167 (220) 220% 
87873 53490 (61) 61% 
66290 56593 (85) 85% 
147960 60867 (41) 41% 
63400 59793 (94) 94% 
65590 68377 (104) 104% 
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Post-crisis  
 Test-year Mean Ratios of Difference of Intrinsic Value & Change in 
Mean Ratios of Difference of Intrinsic Value After determining the baseline 
MRDIV for each tract, I calculated the MRDIV for each tract for the year 2011, 
as well as the change (Δ) in MRDIV for each tract. In the Collier County NSP 
census tract the 2011 MRDIV was 1.1 ([.65+.63+.70+1.27+.77+2.04+ 
1.30+1.08+.99+1.31+ .81+1.06+1.67]/13=1.12221). The NSP tract Δ MRDIV 
was 0.02316. In the non-NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was approximately 
0.9 ([1.06+.72+1.23+ 1.06+1.03+1+.87+.50+.62+ .89]/10=0.899886883). The 
non-NSP tract Δ MRDIV was 0.023021195.  
In the Marion County NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was 1.3 
([1.69+1.92+.94+1.45+.73+1.06+2.37+.90+1.23+.77]/10 = 1.311347594). The 
NSP tract Δ MRDIV was -0.066928126.  The NSP tract Δ MRDIV was                
-0.064274806. In the non-NSP census tracts the 2011 MRDIV was approximately 
1.27 ([1.04+1.48+ 1.03+1.20+ 1.07+1.78]/6= 1.267406515). The non-NSP tract Δ 
MRDIV was -0.00940356.  
In the Rockledge NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was approximately 
1.09 ([.54+.89+.88+1.95+1.49+.51+1.52+1.15+ .67+1.29]/10= 1.08930475). In 
the non-NSP census tract the 2011 MRDIV was 1.03 ([.26+.76+.85+2.46+1.96+ 
.87+ 1.11+.40+.82+.84]/10= 1.032250393). The non-NSP tract Δ MRDIV was     
-0.09218808. 
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Table 9 - Collier NSP Tract  2011  Values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collier NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2011 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
19,110 12,476  (65) 65% 
 20,424 13,009 (63)  63% 
204,24 14,252 (70) 70% 
12,476 15,895 (127) 127% 
24,790 19,110 (77)  77% 
25,974 53,079 (204) 204% 
15,890 20,646 (130) 130% 
63,319 68,485(108) 108% 
91,791 90,541 (99) 99% 
87,191 114,196 (131)  131% 
114,697 92,763 (81) 81% 
96,767 102,494 (106) 106% 
5,195 8,658 (167) 167% 
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Table 10 - Collier Non-NSP Tract  2011 Values 
Collier Non-NSP Tract  2011 Values 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2011 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
131943 140516 (106) 106% 
145380 105331 (72) 72% 
94277 116307 (123) 123% 
131577 139727(106) 106% 
159842 165409 (103) 103% 
167887 168301 (100) 100% 
134883 116876 (87) 87% 
263158 132530 (50) 50% 
130560 80946 (62) 62% 
131943 116949 (89) 89% 
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Table 11- Marion NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Marion NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2011 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
41,417 70,380 (170) 170% 
22,400 43,076 (192) 192% 
47,951 45,304 (94) 94% 
47,951 70,003 (146) 146% 
59,910 43,866 (73) 73% 
37,059 39,442 (106) 106% 
34,072 81,067 (283) 238% 
40,056 36,136 (90) 90% 
39,289 48,419 (123) 123% 
84,110 65,282 (78)  78% 
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Table 12 - Marion Non-NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Marion Non-NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2011 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
87,461 90,763 104% 
99,402 146,660 148% 
75,150 77,773 103% 
77,723 93,556 120% 
84,968 90,765 107% 
158,611 283,029 178% 
 
Table 13 - Rockledge NSP Tract 2011 Values 
Rockledge NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2011 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
87461 90763 104% 
99402 146660 148% 
75150 77773 103% 
77723 93556 120% 
84968 90765 107% 
158611 283029 178% 
87461 90763 104% 
99402 146660 148% 
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75150 77773 103% 
77723 93556 120% 
  
 
Table 14 - Rockledge Non-NSP Tract 2011 Values 
Rockledge Non-NSP Tract  2011  Values 
Distressed Non-Distressed  2011 average % of Distressed 
neighbor 
58980 15100 26% 
70820 53590 76% 
81790 69240 85% 
36270 89250 246% 
60460 118760 196% 
65860 57170 87% 
55610 61550 111% 
147620 58950 40% 
75860 62540 82% 
85420 71720 84% 
 
 Regression Deeper analysis of how effectively NSP investments eased the impact 
of foreclosure on neighboring home values required the use of linear regression. The 
following linear regression was executed to determine the extent of the relationship 
between NSP dollars spent and the Δ MRDIV:  Y = a + bX; where X= NSP Expenditure 
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(IV) and Y= Δ MRDIV (DV) using Slope(b) = ΣXY - [(ΣX)( ΣY)/n)] / ΣX2 – [(ΣX)2/n] 
The results returned a Beta coeficcient of  .854 that was not statistically signifcant (sig = 
.348). The adjusted R-squared is 0.43, indicating that a substantial part of the variance in 
Δ MRDIV within the NSP neighborhoods could be attributable to NSP expenditure. If the 
sample better reflected the population (in this case neighborhoods with NSP expenditure) 
one dollar of NSP spending could be expected to cause a .85 change in Δ MRDIV. The 
level of statistical signifigance is so far outside of acceptable range, however, the 
regression yields little usefull information to analyze the efficacy of NSP expenditure. 
Appendix one contains a copy of the SPSS regression results.  
 
Table 15 - Regression Variables 
NSP Expenditure* 
(X) 
Δ MRDIV** 
(Y) 
37.8  0.02316 
23.93  -0.066928126  
10.2  -0.064274806 
                              ̅    23.97667       ̅  = 0.073334 
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Table 16 - Estimates 
NSP Expenditure* 
(X) 
Δ MRDIV** (Y) Y*X X*X 
37.8  0.08880  3.35664 1428.84 
23.93  0.066928126  1.601590055 572.6449 
10.2  0.064274806 0.655603021 104.04 
ΣX = $ 71.93 ΣY = 
0.220002932 
ΣXY = $ 
5.613833 
 
ΣX2 = 2105.525 
 
 *hundreds of thousands of dollars 
**absolute value 
 Discussion This research began with the assumption that foreclosure adversely 
affected the relative value of nearby properties. The contagion effect of foreclosure has 
been documented by numerous researchers in planning and economics (Wassmer, 2010; 
Wodka, 2009; Lee 2008; Lauria, 1998). The most concrete measurement of the contagion 
effect was the decline in relative value of non-distressed homes as a result of 
neighborhood discounting flowing from concentrated foreclosures. As a result, I asked 
how well the NSP mitigated this effect. The data, however, do not reveal a contagion 
effect. Moreover, in the one neighborhood-pair where there was a clear property value 
related contagion effect, non-distressed homeowners in the NSP neighborhood (Golden 
Gate Estates) experienced greater loss of relative value than non-distressed owners in the 
non-NSP neighborhood (Naples Park). In Marion Oaks, Turning Point, Central 
Rockledge, and Country Club Estates, non-distressed property owners experienced an 
increase in appraised value relative to their distressed neighbors.  
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 Golden Gate Estates homeowners experienced a loss of relative value related to 
the contagion effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was about 2.3% dropping from a 
baseline average of 1.12 to 1.09 in 2011. A hypothetical home in Golden Gate Estates is 
worth $100,000; the home next door is worth $112,000. The first home goes through 
foreclosure. During the same time period there is a 30% decline in property values 
overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the predicted value of the neighboring property would 
be approximately $76,933 instead of $78,554. Therefore, the neighboring household has 
lost $1,611 as a result of the contagion effect of foreclosure.  
 Naples Park homeowners experienced a loss of relative value related to the 
contagion effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was also about 2.3% dropping from a 
baseline average of .922 to .899 in 2011. A hypothetical home in Naples Park is worth 
$100,000; the home next door is worth $92,200. The first home goes through foreclosure. 
During the same time period there is a 30% decline in property values overall. 
Considering the Δ MRDIV the predicted value of the neighboring property would be 
approximately $44,950 instead of $46,100. Therefore, the neighboring household has lost 
$1,150 as a result of the contagion effect of foreclosure.  
 Owners of non-distressed homes in Marion Oaks experienced an increase of 
relative value in spite of their proximity to a concentration of foreclosures. The Δ 
MRDIV was about -6.7% climbing from a baseline average of 1.244 to 1.311 in 2011. A 
hypothetical home in Marion Oaks is worth $100,000; the home next door is worth 
$124,441. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same time period there is 
a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the predicted value 
of the neighboring property would be approximately $65,550 instead of $62,205. 
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Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $3,345 of value relative to the value of 
the neighboring property.   
 Turning Point non-distressed homeowners experienced an increase of relative 
value at a time of high foreclosure rates. The Δ MRDIV was practically infinitesimal, 
approximately -.009% rising from a baseline average of 1.258 to 1.267 in 2011. A 
hypothetical home in Turning Point Estates is worth $100,000; the home next door is 
worth $124,441. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same time period 
there is a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the 
predicted value of the neighboring property would be approximately $126,700 instead of 
$125,800. Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $900 of value relative to the 
value of the neighboring property.  These data indicate a high degree of neighborhood 
stability.  
 Country Club Estates non-distressed property owners benefited from relative 
property value increases when neighboring properties were affected by foreclosure. The 
Δ MRDIV was approximately -6.4% rising slightly from a baseline average of 1.025 to 
1.089 in 2011. A hypothetical home in Country Club Estates is worth $100,000; the home 
next door is worth $102,503. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same 
time period there is a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV 
the predicted value of the neighboring property would be approximately $54,450 instead 
of $51,250. Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $3,200 of value relative to 
the value of the neighboring property.   
 Central Rockledge non-distressed property owners also saw their property values 
increase when their neighbors went through foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was 
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approximately -9.2% rising considerably from a baseline average of .94 to 1.032 in 2011. 
A hypothetical home in Central Rockledge is worth $100,000; the home next door is 
worth $94,000. The first home goes through foreclosure. During the same time period 
there is a 30% decline in property values overall. Considering the Δ MRDIV the 
predicted value of the neighboring property would be approximately $51,600 instead of 
$47,000. Therefore, the neighboring household has gained $4,600 of value relative to the 
value of the neighboring property.   
 In “Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures” Scheutz, 
Been, and Ellen indicate that real estate dynamics in New York City neighborhoods are 
idiosyncratic and the observed effect of clustered foreclosures may not be generalizable 
to other communities (Schuetz, et al, 2008).  Local distinctiveness is not unique to New 
York City. The home values of all neighborhoods are shaped by the economic and 
cultural context of a broader community.  It is likely that the contagion effect of 
foreclosure exists and is measurable in terms of relative home value.  
 The specific market parameters of Country Club Estates and Marion Oaks deviate 
from the overall trend. Moreover, the lack of statistical significance and the limited 
sample size support the inference that a larger universe of properties, in a greater number 
of neighborhoods would reveal trends that conform to the findings of previous 
researchers. Unfortunately, in spite of the time and effort invested in the collection, 
handling, and analysis of these data, they do not support any conclusive inferences 
regarding how well the NSP reduces the loss of value to homes in neighborhoods with 
high foreclosure rates.  
 
 79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Case Studies of Florida Jurisdictions Implementing NSP 
 Marion County Overview Marion County applied for and received a $6,324,055 
NSP 1 grant (Marion County Community Services, 2009). More than 78% of that money 
was spent on acquisition. Most of the balance was spent on residential renovation. The 
program has generated substantial income, recovering more than 10% of the grant 
amount in the end of the third quarter of 2011. This income has already been reinvested 
into new acquisition and rehabilitation.  
 Marion County allocated funds to four areas: West Ocala, Marion Oaks, Rainbow 
Park, and Silver Springs. West Ocala is an urban neighborhood immediately west of 
downtown Ocala. Marion Oaks is a large master-planned community in the southern 
portion of the county near the border of Sumter County. Rainbow Park is located in the 
rural western portion of the county. Silver Springs is east of Ocala, adjacent to the Ocala 
National Forest.   
 Under HUD guidelines, NSP grantees can outsource the implementation of the 
program to partners with expertise in real estate acquisition, renovation, and property 
management. Marion County elected to partner with a Gainesville based non-profit, the 
Neighborhood Housing & Development Corporation (NHDC), as well as Habitat for 
Humanity of Marion County, and another governmental entity, the Ocala Housing 
Authority. Together, these entities acquired sixty-seven homes. Of those, the NHDC 
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acquired and renovated forty-five (Marion County Community Services, 2009; 
Thompson, 2011).  
 Located near the center of the state, Marion County is the focus of the equestrian 
industry in Florida. Ocala is the county seat and largest city. Although only 16% of the 
county’s population lives within the corporate boundaries of Ocala, my personal 
observations and interactions with long-time residents indicates that the majority of 
Marion County residents identify with the city.   
 Two factors collude to create the rural character of Ocala and Marion County.  
First, the eastern portion of the county is dedicated to Ocala National Forest, creating a 
permanent barrier to development and nurturing an economy based on nature-tourism. 
Second, the predominate agricultural enterprise in the area, horse breeding, produces high 
value agricultural land uses that create a markedly different dynamic than other parts of 
the state.  
 The importance of the horse to the economy, culture and identity of Marion 
County cannot be overstated. Throughout the area there are numerous public and private 
displays of the community’s adoration for the animal. The downtown area is filled with 
sculptures of horses funded by the Marion Cultural Alliance and the Florida 
Thoroughbred Breeders’ and Owners Association (FTBOA) (Rogers, 2009). Citing a 
2005 study by the American Horse Council, the FTBOA reports that 431 farms operate 
70,000 acres in Marion County (Florida Thoroughbred Breeders' and Owners' 
Association , 2011). Collectively, these enterprises, along with hobbyists, own a stock of 
at least 35,300 horses. The horse farms and related industries (e.g. feed suppliers, training 
centers, blacksmiths, etc.) have an annual economic impact on the county in excess of 1.3 
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billion dollars, and have investments of $3.5 billion in land, equipment, supplies, and 
livestock. Several championship racehorses were reared in Marion County. Each year, 
horse enthusiasts from across the nation travel to Ocala for horse auctions, shows, and 
competitions. According to the USDA census of agriculture, Marion County boasts the 
largest inventory of “horses and ponies” in the United States and the second highest 
market value for all livestock (United States Department fo Agriculture, 2007). 
Additionally, hay and other forage grown in Marion County have the second highest 
market value in the United States. Moreover, Ocala is the center of an equestrian 
agglomeration, as horse related businesses benefit from locating near each other.  
Equestrian activity is concentrated in the areas of the county west and north of Ocala. 
Even at the height of the mid-2000s housing bubble, these land uses resisted market 
pressures to use land for housing and exurban development. During the same time period 
other parts of the state experienced market values for farm and pasture land well below 
the market value for housing creating pressure to develop at the periphery.  
 Another important factor influences the development pattern in Marion County, 
its proximity to The Villages. Located immediately to the south of Marion County, The 
Villages is a master planned retirement community with 51,442 residents (United States 
Census Bureau, 2011a). The entire community is age restricted, with a median age of 
69.8. Residents of the Villages are middle-class to affluent retirees most of whom are 
recent transplants from the Northeast and Midwest. According to the Census Bureau, 
92.5% of the population of The Villages was born outside Florida; 11% of residents in 
2010 did not reside in The Villages in 2009. The Census identifies 98.5% as White and 
reports that 73.8% live in husband-wife households without children (2011). With mean 
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incomes of $62,100 (21,755 from Social Security) the people of The Villages have 
money to spend. For the most part, however, the workforce that serves The Villages 
cannot reside within the community, and must commute. Estimates for the number of 
workers commuting from southern Marion County to the Villages range from 1,043 – 
8,000 (Lake-Sumter Metroplitain Planning Organization, 2011; Skolnik, 2011). 
Consequently, the housing developments at the southern edge of Marion County function 
as bedroom communities for the service industry in The Villages.  
 
  Figure 13 – Typical West Ocala Housing Stock 
 West Ocala West Ocala is a neighborhood immediately west of downtown Ocala. 
Two compact census tracts are entirely within the neighborhood. Tract 17 is the western 
portion of West Ocala and tract 18 is the eastern portion of the neighborhood, bounded by 
downtown Ocala. Demographic, economic, and housing stock data from each tract are 
presented here separately. The reason for this choice is that aggregating and averaging the 
data obscures the difference in degree of racial segregation and poverty in the different 
sections of the neighborhood.  
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 In census tract 17, non-Hispanic Whites comprise 14.8% of the population, 
Hispanics of all races are 23.8% of the population, and a solid majority are Black or 
African American at 59.5% of the population. According to the Census Bureau, the 
median income is 22,484. Nearly one-third (31.4%) of the population earns less than 
$15,000 per year. Owner-occupied homes account for 32.5% of households in tract 17. 
Most of the homes were built after 1960, and 32.9% have been built since 2000. Of the 
owner-occupied homes, 67.0% have a mortgage. Among renters, 57.9% of households 
pay at least 35% of their monthly income for rent, while 44.5% of owner-occupied 
households pay more than 35% of their monthly income for their mortgage payments. 
Turnover is very high in census tract 17; 53.4% of residents moved into their homes after 
2005. More than one out of five (20.6%) homes in census tract 17 is vacant.  
 In census tract 18, non-Hispanic Whites comprise 4.3 % of the population, 
Hispanics of all races are 2.8% of the population, Black or African American accounts 
for nearly all of the census tract’s population at 91.7% of the population. According to 
the Census, the median income is $15,938. The median figure obscures the depth of West 
Ocala’s poverty. Fully one-third (33.7%) of the households in census tract 18 earn less 
than $10,000 per year. Owner-occupied homes account for 52.4% of households in tract 
18.  A majority of the housing stock (79.7% of homes) was built between 1940 and 1969. 
Of the owner-occupied homes, 43.4% have a mortgage. The monthly costs of living in 
the neighborhood as a portion of monthly income split markedly between owners and 
renters.  Among renters, 70.5% of households pay at least 35% of their monthly income 
for rent. Only 12.6% of owner-occupied households allocate the same portion of their 
monthly income to their mortgage payments. According to the American Community 
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Survey (ACS), the median rent in the census tract is $510 per month, which is 61.22% of 
the approximate gross monthly income of a family earning $10,000 per year. Turnover is 
high, although it is less than half that of tract 17; 25.0% of residents moved into their 
homes after 2005. The vacancy rate is 15.0%. 
 The vitality of West Ocala is hindered by the accumulated effects of systemic 
racism. The neighborhood generally and census tract 18 specifically, is by far the least 
diverse area examined in this research. It is also a place of vivid physical poverty. Much 
of the building stock is substandard. When I visited the neighborhood, many if not most 
of the homes I observed seemed subjectively unfit for habitation. Every roof shows 
evidence of leaks; there are holes in exterior walls covered with corrugated metal and 
plastic. Piles of building debris and household garbage fill lots between homes. There is 
indoor furniture outside of nearly every home. The best maintained homes are secured 
with burglar bars and perimeter fences. The elementary school that serves the area 
received a grade of F from FLDOE. The High School received a C; the middle school an 
A. Incidents of property crime in the neighborhood are numerous and correlate less 
frequently to vacancy than in the other neighborhoods examined in this research.  
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Figure 14 - West Ocala Memorial to American slaves 
 The history of West Ocala is a tragic. In 1860 the majority of Marion County’s 
population was comprised of African-American slaves, according to the City of Ocala 
Historic Preservation office. Upon emancipation, a group of freedman settled in what is 
now West Ocala when a former slave owner donated the land and funds to start a school 
for children of freed slaves (City of Ocala, 2012). Over time, the Black majority grew. 
During reconstruction a class of Black politicians and businessmen established 
themselves as the city’s leadership. A black militia was organized to protect the 
community during Reconstruction.  
 By 1872, Blacks comprised 65% of voters, and 73% of the population Marion 
County (City of Ocala, 2012). The end of Reconstruction opened the door for the gradual 
marginalization of the Black community in Ocala. Intimidation and de jure segregation 
forced the Black community to retreat into West Ocala. The last Black city councilman 
before the civil rights movement was elected in 1903 (Rawls, 2007).  By 1936 only 500 
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Blacks were registered to vote in Marion County. At the same time, steady population 
growth led to a shift in the demographics of Ocala. By 1900 the proportion of Marion 
County residents who were Black fell to 61 %, falling to 49% in 1930 (City of Ocala, 
2012). Today, concentrated poverty characterizes West Ocala. The post-integration 
suburbanization of upwardly mobile Black families to neighborhoods like Marion Oaks is 
evaporating the human capital that remains in West Ocala.  
 Marion County’s NSP investment in West Ocala consists primarily of multi-
family low income housing. Satisfying the low income housing requirement and 
navigating local social and political realities appear to be the goals of the investment in 
West Ocala. Containing the effects of foreclosure seems to be of secondary importance in 
West Ocala, a neighborhood that by any objective measure struggled even before the 
foreclosure crisis.  
The real estate market in West Ocala does not function properly. Instead of 
allocating land and money to the socially beneficial use, the market dynamic within the 
neighborhood results in the continuous reproduction of an exploitative extraction of 
wealth. The sharp contrast between the monthly housing costs of homeowners and renters 
in West Ocala, combined with the poor state of the housing stock and the relatively low 
proportion of owner-occupied homes secured by a mortgage, indicates that outside 
property owners extract revenue from the neighborhood while investing little. 
Homeowners likely have limited access to credit, and cannot invest in their properties. 
Renters in the neighborhood likely have similar limited access to credit and therefore 
cannot become homeowners. As a result, they must devote a large share of their monthly 
income to rent. The market rents in West Ocala are similar to parts of Marion County 
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which enjoy far superior housing stock reflecting a level of investment that justifies the 
rental rate. Any increase in the rate of homeownership in the neighborhood would likely 
interrupt the rent cash-flow out of the neighborhood. Interestingly, Marion County has 
directed its NSP funds in Marion County to income qualified rental housing. Therefore, 
NSP investment is likely to exacerbate the underlying problem: a lack of capital held by 
West Ocala households.  
 
 Figure 15 - Fire damaged house in Marion Oaks 
 Marion Oaks Marion Oaks is a neighborhood in southern Marion County, 
close to The Villages. The neighborhood if fairly diverse, with non-Hispanic Whites 
comprising 47.3% of the population, Hispanics of all races 32.3%, and Black or African 
American accounting for 19.7%. The median annual household income is $39,164. There 
are 5,429 housing units in the neighborhood, 1,110 (20.4%) of which were vacant in 
2010. Owner-occupied homes account for 73.1% of households in Marion Oaks.  More 
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than half (51.2%) of the homes were built between 1980 and 1999. Of the owner-
occupied homes, 72.2% have a mortgage. Just under half (48.9%) of renter households 
and a little over one-third (36.1%) of owner households apportion at least 35% of their 
monthly income to rent or mortgage payments. Neighborhood turnover is high in Marion 
Oaks; 39.8% of residents moved into their homes after 2005.  
 
 Figure 16 - Real Estate Owned (REO) in Marion Oaks 
Marion Oaks consists primarily of single-family housing. The neighborhood is 
visibly diverse and a large percentage of property records for the neighborhood have 
Hispanic surnames. Evidently the developer originally planned to build multi-family 
housing as well. At present, however, there is only one small multi-family building in 
Marion Oaks which is far removed from the rest of the development. The streets have 
sidewalks and lighting. Bicycle lanes are located on the primary collector streets. The 
homes are block construction.  
 89 
 
Although many properties show the signs of deferred maintenance, pride of 
ownership is visible throughout the neighborhood. Many properties are visibly vacant and 
agent of mortgage-loan servicers have boarded up properties and posted documents 
expressing their intent to secure the property. Property crime has increased dramatically 
in recent years. When I visited I observed two homes on the same block badly damaged 
by fire. The Star-Banner reports that a juvenile was arrested for arson in connection with 
one of the fires. On another occasion there were fourteen burglaries in a two week period. 
Although the targeted properties were not vacant, the rise in vacancy creates a lack of 
“eyes in the street” watching vulnerable properties. The elementary school that serves the 
neighborhood has fallen from a ‘B’ to a ‘C’ while the high school has risen from a ‘C’ to 
a ‘B’ and the middle school has remained constant as a ‘C’ school.  
 
Figure 17 - 150th Terrace Road, Rainbow Park, Marion County 
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 Rainbow Park Rainbow Park is a platted subdivision in the western portion of 
Marion County, near Rainbow Spring State Park.  Approximately 30 homes have been 
built there. The plat recorded with the Marion County Clerk of Court and satellite 
imagery show a complex system of streets radiating out from two center points at 
diagonal lines. In reality, however, the best of these roads is improved with loose gravel 
and most are merely paths created by car tires across wooded land. Oddly, these tracks all 
have signage as if they were urban streets. There are even stop signs where the paths 
intersect. Clearly the developer anticipated high demand for residential lots. The demand 
never materialized and faded signs advertising lots for sale are obscured by trees. Many 
of the “streets” are now impassible due to lack of traffic. Three Rainbow Park homes 
have been purchased through the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. This investment 
represents a significant portion of the housing stock in Rainbow Park.  
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 Figure 18  - SW 24th Street Rainbow Park 
 Rainbow Park is more than twenty miles from Ocala. Apart from a small 
convenience store, there are no retail businesses nearby. The development is bounded on 
all sides by working farms and equestrian facilities such as the Wavetree Stables, 
Meadow Run Farms, Cayote Crossing Farms, Vanner Valley Farms, Ocala West Training 
Facility, Nelson Jones Training Facility, and the Classic Mile Racetrack. These 
businesses deal in the breeding, care, and training of show horses and race horses. The 
market value for one of these animals exceeds that of the homes in Rainbow Park. In fact, 
some of these enterprises have produced champion race horses whose single year 
earnings exceed the NSP investment in the neighborhood. Consequently, there is little 
incentive to allocate land in the area to the commercial uses necessary to support a 
community of several thousand people. For this reason, Rainbow Park is likely to remain 
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a neighborhood only on paper. Although it is an interesting place, observations from 
Rainbow Park are only generalizable to a few areas where premium agricultural land uses 
prevail over competing uses. Therefore, studying the neighborhood at length will add 
little to our understanding of the neighborhood impacts of foreclosure or federal housing 
policy.  
 Silver Springs Shores Silver Springs Shores is a neighborhood in eastern  
Marion County, bordering Ocala National Forest. The neighborhood is racially and 
ethnically diverse, with non-Hispanic Whites comprising 47.8% of the population, 
Hispanics of all races 16.3%, and Black or African American accounting for 35.1%. The 
demography of Silver Springs Shores stands out from other NSP neighborhoods in 
several ways that are worth noting. First, fully 3% identify as two or more races, and 
4.4% identify as “some other race.” In addition, while the median age is fairly young 
(44.1) and 30.2% of households include minor children, 42.4% of households have senior 
citizens present. More than one-third of the households in the neighborhood, 36.8%, are 
non-families. Among the families, 13.3% are headed by single parents. Among those 
households, about one-third are male householder families with no wife present, with 
children under 18. In many ways Silver Springs Shores provides a glimpse of what 
demographers presage the typical American neighborhood will look like by the next 
decennial census.   
  In terms of income, Silver Springs Shores is more homogeneous; the median 
annual household income is $35,103. Fifty percent of households in the neighborhood 
earn between $25,000 and $75,000 per year. There are 3,449 housing units in the 
neighborhood, 781 (22.6%) of which were vacant in 2010. Owner-occupied homes 
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account for 68.9% of households in Silver Springs Shores.  Most (81%) of the homes 
were built between 1970 and 1989. Almost all are 3 bedroom homes. Of the owner-
occupied homes, 66.8% have a mortgage. Just over half (51.8%) of renter households, 
and more than half (50.3%) of owner households allocate at least 35% of their monthly 
income to rent or mortgage payments. Neighborhood turnover is high in Silver Springs 
Shores; 33.1% of residents moved into their homes after 2005.  
 Silver Springs Shores appears to be a healthy neighborhood. Apparently, 
however, most households in the neighborhood simply cannot afford to live there. This is 
especially true considering the average commute is 38 minutes and there is no public 
transportation in the area. Nonetheless, a visitor to the neighborhood would not detect the 
reality depicted in the statistics above. In spite of the affordability problem, residents take 
pride in their homes and take an active interest in the wellbeing of the neighborhood.   
When I visited the neighborhood I could find little evidence of the foreclosure crisis. 
Homes for sale promoted their location and quality construction, not bargain prices. 
While every other Marion County neighborhood had piles of discarded trash and building 
materials dumped in vacant lots, I could find none in Silver Springs Shores. Perhaps most 
telling, Silver Springs Shores is the only neighborhood I visited where adults took notice 
of me visiting vacant and unsecured homes. Apart from a few instances of trespassing 
and vandalism, I could not identify any increase in foreclosure related crime in Silver 
Springs Shores. The schools that serve the neighborhood earn consistent ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
grades. The vacant NSP purchased homes were the only ones that appeared in need of 
maintenance.   
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Turning Point Census tract 009.01 is in southern Marion County, close to 
Marion Oaks. It includes a development called Turning Point, and many single-family 
homes scattered over a semi-rural area. The neighborhood if relatively homogenous with 
regard to race and ethnicity, non-Hispanic Whites account for 74.8% of the population, 
Hispanics of all races 15.3%, and Black or African American are 8.4%. The median 
annual household income is $30,376. In terms of income, the Turning Point census tract 
is the most heterogeneous examined in this research. The modal income category is 
households earning less than $10,000 per year (15.5%). In the same area, 12.9% of 
households earn between $50,000 and $74,000. The distribution is fairly flat, with very 
few household earning more than $75,000.  
 There are 3,098 housing units in the neighborhood, 420 (13.6%) of which were 
vacant in 2010. Owner-occupied homes account for 77.8% of households in the Turning 
Point tract.  A majority (59.9%) of the homes were built between 1980 and 1999. Of the 
owner-occupied homes, a notably low percentage, 48% have a mortgage. More than half 
(54.0%) of renter households and 45.3% of owner households spend at least 35% of their 
monthly income to rent or mortgage payments. Neighborhood turnover is high, 31.4% of 
residents moved into their homes after 2005.  
There has been some controversy surrounding Marion County’s implementation 
of NSP1. When the Marion County Commission voted to apply for an NSP3 grant, they 
refused to re-contract with NHDC. Apparently Marion County paid NHDC  more than 
$7,000 in fees for every home it renovated and  sold. In addition, the contractor paid 
more than $35,000 per home for renovations (Thompson, 2011). The other major 
contractor for Marion County, Habitat for Humanity, spent only $2,600 on each house 
 95 
 
(Thompson, 2011). The NHDC handled most of Marion County’s NSP 1 transactions. 
The per unit fee structure would raise the net administrative costs above 10%, which is 
prohibited under NSP guidelines. It is unclear whether HUD will seek to recapture any 
NSP1 funds from Marion County.  
 Collier County Overview Collier County applied for and received a $7,306,755 
NSP 1 grant (Collier County Housing & Human Services, 2010). More than 85% of that 
money has been spent on acquisition, renovation, and land banking. The program 
generated income of $738,243 by the end of the third quarter of 2011. To date, Collier 
County has failed to fully fund the Low Income Housing element of its action plan, 
spending only 22.8% of all funds on housing for those earning 50% or less of AMI 
(Collier County Housing & Human Services, 2011). 
Collier County is located in Southwest Florida. Naples, the principal city in 
Collier County, is an extremely affluent community. The economy is based largely on 
tourism, retail, construction, and healthcare. In addition, agriculture drives the economy 
of the eastern portion of the county especially around the town of Immokalee.  A 
substantial portion of the county’s total area is undevelopable environmentally sensitive 
land. Portions of the county are within the Corkscrew Regional Ecosystem Watershed, 
the Florida Panther National Wildlife Refuge, Picayune Strand State Forest, Collier 
Seminole State Forest, Fackahatchee Strand State Preserve Park, Big Cypress National 
Preserve, and Everglades National Park. Marco Island is a secondary community south of 
Naples; it is a prosperous resort town. The tiny island towns of Chokoloskee and 
Everglades City are located in the southern portion of the county. The two communities 
are completely surrounded by environmentally sensitive land and waterways.  
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Locals colloquially refer to most of the populated area of the county as ‘Naples’ 
despite the fact that the actual City of Naples is fairly compact. All of the Collier County 
neighborhoods examined here are in the unincorporated county. Although they all have 
mailing addresses of ‘Naples’ and are referred to as such by those who live there, they are 
not part of Naples. In fact, parts of Golden Gate Estates are thirty miles from downtown 
Naples.  
East of Naples is a development called Golden Gate City, which despite its name 
is located in unincorporated Collier County. The neighborhood, home to a large portion 
of the county’s workforce, has experienced an ethnic shift over the last two decades. In 
2000, Hispanics of all races accounted for 37.1% of the population of Golden Gate City, 
Black or African American accounted for only 10.2% of the population, and non-
Hispanic Whites comprised 49.6% of the population  (United States Census Bureau, 
2011d). In 2010 those numbers were 58.5%, 17.2%, and 24.2% respectively (United 
States Census Bureau, 2011). Development began in the 1970’s, and the area was built 
out by the late 1990’s. In the 2000s, development shifted north and east into an area 
known as Golden Gate Estates, a sprawling 80 square mile plat, much of which is not 
buildable due to seasonal flooding.  
East of Golden Gate Estates is land still held by Barron Collier Companies (BCC) 
named for its founder Barron G. Collier, the developer for whom Collier County is also 
named. Part of that land includes 25,000 acres currently being developed in conjunction 
with businessman and philanthropist Tom Monaghan, founder of Domino’s Pizza and 
Ave Maria University.  
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In 2004 Monaghan and BCC announced their plans to build a new town centered 
around a catholic university, law school, and seminary. Monaghan committed $400 
million dollars to the project and the Colliers committed the 25,000 acres including a 
substantial conservation easement as well as promises to provide necessary infrastructure 
(Sollitto, 2004, p. 68; Meadows, 2006). The developers projected construction of 5,120 
homes between 2007 and 2012. As of February 2012, only 374 have been built (Freeman, 
2012). In 2006 Monaghan proposed that Ave Maria would eventually have 11,000 homes 
and local business leaders expected the development to trigger growth throughout eastern 
Collier County (Meadows, 2006). For several years the buzz around Ave Maria drove 
speculation in Golden Gate Estates, situated between Naples and Ave Maria, inflating 
home and land values.  
The County experienced tremendous growth in the first decade of the Twenty-
First Century. The population grew from 246,589 in 2000 to 321,520 in 2010 (United 
States Census Bureau, 2011c; United States Census Bureau, 2011b). The 30% increase 
followed a similar increase in the 1990s creating high demand for housing.  
Golden Gate/Golden Gate Estates Golden Gate Estates remains mostly vacant. 
Originally platted in 1966, the first homes were built in the 1970’s (WR Wilson & 
Associates Inc, 1966). Most lots are 2.5 acres with considerable setbacks. Although there 
are probably several thousand people living in Golden Gate Estates, there are few 
publicly provided urban services. Households rely upon wells and septic tanks and only a 
handful of streets have lighting. Collier County does provide trash pick-up and the 
Sheriff’s Department maintains a substation in the neighborhood. Currently, the area is 
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served by its own fire-district; however, there is a strong possibility that services will be 
consolidated with another low-density area to the south (Freeman, 2012).  
Unfortunately, because the community is not a Census Designated Place (CDP) it 
is difficult to ascertain demographic and housing information. The Census website 
AmericanFactFinder reveals that census tracts 104.5 and 104.7, which partially comprise 
Golden Gate Estates, have roughly 9,206 residents. However, the Golden Gate Estates 
Area Civic Association (GGEACA) claims a population of 36,000. The census reports 
that in the two tracts examined, non-Hispanic Whites account for 79.1% of the 
population, Hispanics of all races 13%, and Black or African American 6.6%. Personal 
observation suggests that the neighborhood’s population is about half what the GGEACA 
claims, and that the Hispanic population must be larger. Personal observation also 
indicates that there is a tendency for Hispanics to settle in the eastern portion of Golden 
Gate Estates and for non-Hispanics to settle in the western half. The existing homes are 
mostly in the western half of Golden Gate Estates and home values drop dramatically 
moving east. Collier County property appraiser records indicate that the building stock 
ranges in age from 0-30 years old in the western half of the neighborhood, and rarely 
exceeds 10 years old in the eastern half. 
Naples Park Naples Park is a working class neighborhood immediately north of 
Naples. It is bounded on the west and south by very exclusive affluent neighborhoods. 
The demographic profile roughly matches that of the county as a whole with non-
Hispanic Whites comprising 72.5% of the population, Hispanics of all races 22.6%, and 
Black or African American slightly underrepresented at 2.5% (United States Census 
Bureau, 2011f). There are 3,117 housing units in the neighborhood, 511 (16.4%) of 
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which were vacant in 2010. Owner-occupied homes account for 52.5% of households in 
Naples Park.  Nearly three-quarters (73.9%) of the homes were built between 1970 and 
1989. Of the owner-occupied homes 67.2% have a mortgage. The majority (63.7% or 
renters and 53.3% of owners) of households pay at least 35% of their monthly income to 
rent or mortgage payments. There is high turnover, nearly a third (32.8%) of residents 
moved in to their homes after 2005 (United States Census Bureau, 2011e).  
The Department of Housing and Urban Development initially rejected the 
County’s application for NSP funds. The Collier Housing and Human Services 
Department submitted seven applications before receiving approval (Collier County 
Housing & Human Services, 2010). Unfortunately, implementation has followed the 
same pattern and the Collier neighborhood stabilization program may be the most 
troubled in the state.  
Any major policy implementation will have its share of problems.  Unfortunately, 
NSP is no exception. Collier County is a cautionary tale. The community development 
director there was demoted, ultimately forced to resign, and may face criminal 
prosecution for mishandling NSP funds (Naples NBC-2, 2011). According to local news 
reports, contractors recounted inappropriate billing procedures and possible fictitious 
expenses. Once the media heard the story local television news crews broadcast images 
of homes in serious disrepair where remodeling had stopped. Eager to uncover a scandal, 
the local newspaper revealed that a convicted sex-offender was working as a contractor 
on NSP properties (Albers, 2011).  While the Collier County public may not have been 
aware of NSP until the story broke, the scandal discredits the entire program.  
 100 
 
The Collier County Property Appraiser reports that in 2006 the market value of all 
appraised real property in the county rose 30.81% to $102,357,800,980. That year marks 
the climax of eight years of double digit percentage increases. In 2007 the rate of increase 
fell dramatically to 5.45%. The following year values began to contract, with growth at 
5.72% and that trend has continued through 2011. Between 2007 and 2011 the total 
appraised value of real property in Collier County fell by nearly 35% to $70,336,762,793.   
Naples Park and Golden Gate City follow this pattern and generally saw a rise and 
fall in property values roughly proportionate to the rise and fall of real estate values 
overall. Golden Gate Estates, however, experienced inflation and subsequent collapse of 
land values far greater than the rest of the County.  This is likely attributable to the 
speculation surrounding the development of Ave Maria. Naples Park appears to be a 
stable neighborhood. Golden Gate appears to be transitioning, but in a predictable and 
community affirming manner. In spite of NSP spending in Golden Gate Estates, however, 
the community’s identity has been undermined. For decades the neighborhood was 
associated with semi-rural affordable living at the periphery, an alternative to the 
polished deed restricted neighborhoods of Naples. The expectation that Golden Gate 
Estates would occupy the space between Ave Maria and Naples rapidly transformed the 
neighborhood. Then, when it became apparent that the town of Ave Maria would be slow 
to materialize, Golden Gate Estates experienced abandonment of land and half-finished 
projects were left idle. A handful of arms-length voluntary acquisitions and renovations 
has done little if anything to reverse the trend and stabilize Golden Gate Estates.  
A search of Collier County code enforcement records on select streets with 
several distressed properties revealed that there has been an enormous spike in 
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complaints to code enforcement in all of the Collier County neighborhoods examined 
here (Collier County Growth Management Division - Planning and Regulation, 2012). 
The code enforcemnt cases are frequently intiiated by a neighbor complaint. In Golden 
Gate Estates, many violations have not been corrected, in some cases for years. In the 
other neighborhoods, involving code enforecemnet appears to induce compliance.  
 Brevard – Rockledge Overview Through an interlocal agreement, Brevard 
County administers the NSP and other housing and community services in the City of 
Rockledge. Brevard County applied for and received a $5.2 million NSP 1 grant (Brevard 
County Housing & Human Services, 2010). Of that money, approximately $1,020,000 
has been spent directly in Rockledge. Brevard County’s quarterly reports and public 
records of real estate transactions and notices of commencement naming Brevard County 
and its contractors as parties to a transaction indicate that the funds allocated to 
Rockledge were all spent in the census tract containing Country Club Estates. Nearly all 
the funds have been spent on acquisition and renovation
1
. Countywide the program 
generated income of $649,926 by the end of the third quarter of 2011. Brevard County 
has not yet met its obligations under the Low Income Housing element of its action plan, 
spending 24.8% of all funds on housing for those earning 50% or less of AMI (Brevard 
County Housing and Human Services, 2011). 
Brevard County is located on the East Coast of Central Florida and is the center of 
the region often referred to as the “Space Coast.”  Cape Canaveral Space Center and 
                                                          
1
 My estimate of the funds allocated to Rockledge is based on itemized expenditures within the city. 
Therefore it excludes administrative costs, almost always 10% of the total grant amount, which are not 
itemized in the quarterly reports. Brevard has committed no funds to land-banking and little to 
demolition.  
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Patrick Air Force base are both located in Brevard County. Additionally, the County’s 
beach communities are a destination for surfers and other tourists.  
Rockledge is in the southernmost portion of the County’s mainland. The economy 
is based largely on tourism and retail. Although Rockledge is the oldest city in Brevard 
County, it lives in the shadow of its famous neighbors, communities renowned for their 
beaches as well as their military and aerospace intuitions. The western edge of Rockledge 
is bounded by environmentally sensitive land. Specifically, the River Lakes Conservation 
Area limits the City’s westward growth. The Indian River Lagoon forms the eastern 
boundary of the City. Other municipalities bound the City on the north (Cocoa) and south 
(Melbourne).  
The demographic profile differs slightly from that of Brevard County as a whole 
with non-Hispanic Whites comprising 74.5% of the population, Hispanics of all races 
slightly overrepresented at 6.4%, and a concentration of Black or African American 
relative to Brevard County as a whole at 15.7%. Rockledge enjoys a median income 
18.38% higher than Brevard County as a whole (74,626/63,039). 
 Central Rockledge is a neighborhood southeast of the Barton Boulevard and 
Fiske Boulevard intersection. In the census tract that contains Central Rockledge, non-
Hispanic Whites comprise 78.4% of the population; Hispanics of all races are only 3.0%, 
and Black or African American account for 13.6%. According to the Census, the median 
income is 66,819. Owner-occupied homes account for 84.3%of households in Central 
Rockledge. More than half (54.1%) of the homes were built between 1980 and 1999. Of 
the owner-occupied homes 73.0% have a mortgage. Owner and renter households in 
Central Rockledge experience dissimilar housing costs as a portion of monthly income.  
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Among renters, 54.8% of households pay at least 35% of their monthly income for rent. 
Only 19.7% of owner-occupied households allocate the same portion of their monthly 
income to their mortgage payments. Compared to other communities, Central Rockledge 
is relatively stable; 20.1% of residents moved in to their homes after 2005. The most 
recent American Community Survey reports that 14.8% of the housing units in the census 
tract containing Central Rockledge are vacant. 
 Central Rockledge is something of a surprise. It is in an urban area, in a part of 
the state that has been long settled. Moreover, close proximity to the water often 
correlates with neighborhood prosperity. Central Rockledge, however, is characterized by 
blighted commercial properties, and manufactured homes. The commercial spaces have 
ubiquitous and senseless graffiti. A local drug store has been converted to a night club 
whose signage is hand painted on a sheet of plywood. While some parts of the 
neighborhood appear well maintained, much of the building stock is long past its usable 
life. More importantly, there appears to be no neighborhood cohesion. Different sections 
of the neighborhood are accessible from different collector streets and moving through 
the neighborhood in a vehicle is difficult. There are no sidewalks and most of the 
residential streets lack lighting. Some streets have well maintained sitebuilt homes, while 
others have dated single-wide trailers.  
 Country Club Estates is northwest of the Barton Boulevard and Fiske Boulevard 
intersection. In the census tract that contains Country Club Estates non-Hispanic Whites 
comprise 66.9% of the population, Hispanics of all races are 4.6%. Black or African 
American accounts for 27.6% of the population, a high concentration relative to 
neighboring census tracts. According to the Census Bureau, the median income is 47,288, 
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nearly 30% below that of the neighboring census tract. Owner-occupied homes account 
for 86.1% of households in Country Club Estates.  A little less than half (44.9%) of the 
homes were built between 1970 and 1989. Of the owner-occupied homes 73.0% have a 
mortgage. The majority (49.5% of renters and 45.0% of owners) of households pay at 
least 35% of their monthly income to rent or mortgage payments. There is modest 
turnover; 24.2% of residents moved in to their homes after 2005. According to the most 
recent American Community Survey, 13.5% of the homes in the census tract containing 
Country Club Estates are vacant.  
 An uninformed visitor to Country Club Estates would not know that the 
neighborhood has been so severely impacted by the foreclosure crisis. The homes are all 
well maintained. There are sidewalks and lighted streets. The only indication of trouble is 
that several properties have sheets of paper displayed on the windows indicating that they 
are bank owned. The papers include emergency contact information in case there is a 
problem with the property. Code enforcement information indicates that the City of 
Rockledge has begun maintaining some of the bank owned properties and taken liens to 
recover expenses. There is an active community watch which participates in a program 
through the Rockledge Police Department to maintain a list of vacant homes and ensure 
that neighbors and police officers routinely check on the properties.     
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 The conclusion of this research is presented in three parts. The first section is an 
acknowledgment of the limitations of this research, specifically the elements of the 
research design that limit the generalizability of the findings. The second summarizes and 
synthesizes the findings of this research relating it back to the theoretical framework 
outlined in Chapter Three. The final section includes policy implications highlighting the 
strengths and weaknesses of NSP implementation in Florida and indicates some of the 
lessons that might inform future neighborhood policy and planning practice.   
Limitations The chief limitation of this research is its narrow focus on a small 
number properties in a handful of neighborhoods. A larger sample of neighborhoods and 
properties may provide better insights into the effectiveness of direct market participation 
to mitigate the decline in value experienced by homeowners adjacent to a foreclosure. 
This work yields deep contextual insights into the neighborhoods examined here. The 
quantitative portion of this research did uncover the uneven discounting of home values 
in six neighborhoods through the period of speculative inflation and subsequent decline. 
Nonetheless, it remains handicapped by the very small n. A research design that 
employed the same methodology but relied upon a larger n – perhaps thousands of homes 
in a hundred neighborhoods across the Sunbelt – may reveal patterns in greater 
conformity with the literature and support more conclusive findings as to whether the 
NSP has successfully stabilized the discounting of homes in neighborhoods with high 
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foreclosure rates. Such a study would be less susceptible to localized aberrations and 
could measure trends in the abstract real estate market.  
 
The research question itself may rest on a false premise. Although there is 
academic consensus among those researchers who study foreclosure that there is such a 
contagion effect, their research has been limited to severely impacted areas in the middle 
of market corrections (Schuetz et al, 2008; Wassmer, 2010; Immerrgluck 2011; 
Immergluck, 2009b ). Long-range study using a broader sampling frame may show that 
there is no home value contagion effect to mitigate. This research seems to imply that the 
underlying dynamics of local real estate markets have more to do with comparative home 
values than national trends in the rate of default and foreclosure. 
Trends in home values are extremely localized. As mentioned in Chapter Five, 
Scheutz, Been, and Ellen commented that the market for homes in New York City 
neighborhoods is distinctive and not easily compared to other places. They posit that 
phenomena observed in correlation to concentrated foreclosures may not be generalizable 
to other communities (Schuetz, et al, 2008).  Despite the distinctiveness of New York 
City, local distinctiveness is not unique to any particular city. The home values of all 
neighborhoods are shaped by the economic and cultural contexts of a broader 
community. In every part of the county impacted by the housing bubble of the mid-
2000s, there is likely to be neighborhoods similar to Golden Gate Estates. In every part of 
the country with a history of racial segregation, or exclusion of immigrants from existing 
communities, or ethnic balkanization, or economic inequality among an otherwise 
homogenous population, there exists a neighborhood like West Ocala.  
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It is likely that the contagion effect of foreclosure exists and is measurable in 
terms of relative home value. Nonetheless, a singular focus on valuation obscures the 
conditions of actual neighborhoods in which real people live. A flaw in the research 
design is the conceptual separation of the various elements of the contagion effect of 
foreclosure and overdependence on property values to operationalize the contagion effect 
of foreclosure. More time and foresight would have allowed for greater integration of the 
findings into a cohesive narrative of the impacts of the housing bubble, the foreclosure 
crisis, and the NSP intervention.  
Finally, personal observation has limited utility as a research tool. Although the 
site visits used for this research were thorough and systematic, they are imperfect. My 
ability to observe a neighborhood was limited by time and the enormity of the task. An 
individual researcher working alone has limited opportunity to engage the character of a 
neighborhood. Moreover, any observations I make are, of course, filtered through a 
particular embodied consciousness. I am a White Anglophone male of a particular age 
acculturated within a certain social context. As such, I may not have appreciated subtle 
clues and signals of neighborhood vitality or decline in communities markedly different 
from my own. Although I tried to be as perceptive as possible and to couch my 
observations in history and descriptive statistics, it is possible that I failed to note an 
important indicator of neighborhood wellbeing. In addition, the cross-sectional nature of 
the observations is limiting. For instance, one of the indicators of neighborhood 
wellbeing I looked for was illegal dumping, especially around vacant or foreclosed 
properties. It is possible that in the neighborhoods I visited with few illegal dumping sites 
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cleanup crews had visited the day before. Similarly, homes I saw in a state of disrepair 
may be renovated over the next year.   
Summary of Findings The Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has 
modest or no neighborhood level impact on the contagion effect of foreclosure as 
measured by home values and other metrics of neighborhood wellbeing. This research 
cannot support a conclusion that the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has 
effectively mitigated the contagion effect of foreclosure as measured by home values. 
The NSP does not appear to have any effect on crime. Counter intuitively, NSP spending 
correlates to an increase in citations for code violations. 
 Generally, the NSP appears to have failed to stabilize neighborhoods floundering 
in the wake of the foreclosure crisis. In West Ocala and Golden Gate Estates the NSP 
may have actually had a detrimental effect on neighborhood wellbeing. At the same time, 
the NSP augmented the coordinated efforts of residents and local government to stabilize 
a few neighborhoods. In particular, Silver Springs Shores and Country Club Estates 
appear to have benefited from NSP spending. The effects of NSP 1 are less clear in the 
other neighborhoods examined here.   
In Collier County NSP expenditure did little to mitigate the loss in value of non-
distressed homes relative to foreclosed homes. In Golden Gate Estates, an NSP 
neighborhood, homeowners experienced a loss of relative value related to the contagion 
effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was about 2.3% dropping from a baseline average of 
1.12 to 1.09 in 2011. In Naples Park, a non-NSP neighborhood, homeowners experienced 
a loss of relative value related to the contagion effect of foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was 
also about 2.3% dropping from a baseline average of .922 to .899 in 2011. Therefore, in 
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Collier County, Golden Gate Estates homeowners experienced no discernible benefit 
from the NSP as measured by home values.  
In Marion County, NSP expenditure may have benefited homeowners in NSP 
neighborhoods. Generally, the contagion effect is depicted as a loss of relative value 
resulting from nearby foreclosures. Successful intervention to mitigate the effect would 
show less decline in relative value in neighborhoods selected for intervention when 
contrasted with neighborhoods that were not selected. In Marion County, however, 
distressed properties endured such deep discounting that non-distressed properties 
actually increased in value. Owners of non-distressed homes in Marion Oaks – an NSP 
neighborhood – experienced an increase of relative value in spite of their proximity to a 
concentration of foreclosures. The Δ MRDIV was about -6.7% climbing from a baseline 
average of 1.244 to 1.311 in 2011. Nearby in Turning Point – a non-NSP neighborhood – 
non-distressed homeowners experienced a minute increase of relative value at a time of 
high foreclosure rates. The Δ MRDIV was practically infinitesimal, approximately           
-.009% rising from a baseline average of 1.258 to 1.267 in 2011. While this may indicate 
that NSP intervention succeeded in Marion Oaks, it may also be illustrative of the 
severity of Marion Oaks’s decline. Buyers place such a low value on distressed homes in 
Marion Oaks that a bifurcated market has emerged, one for distressed homes, one for 
non-distressed homes. Eventually these sub-market trends will converge. It is likely that 
as time goes on and valuations are reassessed based on comparable sales, the non-
distressed segment of the neighborhood will adjust downward.  
In Rockledge NAP spending benefited the receiving neighborhood. However, the 
NSP appears to have bolstered an already healthy neighborhood. Although Country Club 
 110 
 
Estates has a high concentration of distressed properties, the contagion effect is limited. 
In Country Club estates non-distressed property owners benefited from relative property 
value increases when neighboring properties were affected by foreclosure. The Δ 
MRDIV was approximately -6.4% rising slightly from a baseline average of 1.025 to 
1.089 in 2011.  
In Central Rockledge, an immediately adjacent non-NSP neighborhood, non-
distressed property owners also saw their property values increase when their neighbors 
went through foreclosure. The Δ MRDIV was approximately -9.2% rising considerably 
from a baseline average of .94 to 1.032 in 2011. Again, these data highlight the 
underlying weakness of Central Rockledge and the strength of Country Club Estates. 
Interestingly, the implementing authorities in Brevard County appear to have selected 
comparatively healthy neighborhoods for NSP expenditure (among the neighborhoods 
with high enough foreclosure rates to qualify for the funds). The apparent rationale that 
the limited resources should be expended in neighborhoods best positioned to benefit 
from the intervention appears to be paying off.  
Within the three NSP neighborhoods examined in the quantitative section it is 
unclear how much of the Δ MRDIV is attributable to NSP expenditure. The Beta 
coeficcient of the linear regression was  .854. Therefore the model could explain a 
substantial portion of the variation. However, because the sample may not reflect the 
population (all neighborhoods receiving NSP funds) it is unclear how much of the 
variation is caused by NSP spending. The results do suggest that the effect of NSP 
spending could be significant if the sample was more reliable as regression returned an R-
squared of 0.43. Even if the regression results had provided more conclusive results, 
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however, the directionality would confound the analysis. This research began with the 
well founded assumption that concentrated foreclosure results in a loss of relative value 
to non-distressed homes. In some of the neighborhoods examined here, however, non-
distressed homes actually increased in value.  
Neighborhood Stabilization expenditure appears to have no effect on crime. Bess, 
as well as Immergluck and Smith observed changes in the type and incidence of crime in 
Chicago and Charlotte. Immergluck and Smith demonstrated conclusively that crime 
becomes more common as the foreclosure rate increases.  Meanwhile Bess showed that 
as the inventory of distressed homes increases, the nature of property crimes becomes 
more severe and occur more often in conjunction with violent offenses.   
 There is a crime contagion effect of foreclosure. Marion and Collier County crime 
date indicates that streets with multiple lis pendens experience increases in property 
crime. In these counties, however, it is the neighborhoods with the highest NSP 
expenditures that show the greatest increases in crime. Many of the offenses are minor; 
they often involve juveniles, and they usually relate to the presence of vacant housing. 
The most severe incident I found was an arson in Marion Oaks. More homes were 
acquired through the NSP in Marion Oaks than in any other neighborhood I examined. 
The NHDC spent much more on renovation per house than any other grantee. The reality 
is that vacancy creates opportunity for mischief that escalates into criminal acts. 
Neighborhood Stabilization Funds are targeted to neighborhoods with high vacancy rates. 
The size of the NSP investment is inadequate to take possession of all, or even most, of 
the vacant homes in severely affected neighborhoods. Moreover, most of the NSP 
acquired properties in the neighborhoods examined here sat vacant for several months 
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after the grantees acquired them. Many remain vacant in early 2012.  To contain the 
contagion effect of foreclosure qua crime, housing policy must be tailored to address the 
problem of vacancy, especially in suburban neighborhoods.  
There is no apparent relationship between NSP expenditure and school quality. 
The performance of public schools correlates with economic factors and NSP allocations 
have not had an impact of school performance. With rare exception, schools serving NSP 
areas perform as they performed in the years before the NSP expenditure.  
 The NSP has had a detrimental impact on affordability, except for a small handful 
of direct beneficiaries. For modest income families, the NSP has absorbed inventory and 
over-improved properties that would have otherwise been discounted by the market. In 
every neighborhood examined here the cost of housing amounts to a substantial portion 
of monthly household income. Increased affordability without burdensome financing is 
the key to effective and sustainable neighborhood stabilization. The NSP has done little 
to reduce the household costs of living in the ten neighborhoods examined here.  
Policy Implications As mentioned above, the NSP has had a negative overall 
effect on housing affordability. While some households have received direct housing 
assistance, they comprise a practically infinitesimal minority. For low income and middle 
income families, the NSP has absorbed inventory and over-improved properties that 
would have otherwise been discounted by the market. In every neighborhood examined 
here the cost of housing amounts to a substantial portion of monthly household income. 
This dynamic disincentivizes new household formation and holds vacancy rates high. The 
most practical way to secure vacant homes and therefore prevent increased property 
crime is to place people in the vacant housing. The most effective way to put people in 
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those homes is to directly subsidize housing in neighborhoods above a certain vacancy 
threshold. At the federal level a future neighborhood stabilization policy designed to 
achieve nationwide results might transform the home mortgage interest tax deduction into 
a refundable tax credit available to households earning up to 120% of AMI. Such a policy 
would be self-funding with revenues collected further up the income ladder, drastically 
reduce the cost of implementation by directly subsidizing households, and complement 
the prevailing political philosophy by emphasizing the private housing choices of 
households rather than bureaucratic caprice.   
Additionally, local policy makers could consider enacting ordinances that place 
moratoria on the production of new housing units when vacancies cross a threshold that 
endangers neighborhood stability. Such a proactive policy would prevent the 
destabilization of healthy neighborhoods in the first place. It would also encourage 
investment in existing housing stock and trigger real appreciation in home values. 
Temporary local housing moratoria, in tandem with policies to provide real housing 
choices to low-income households, would achieve the long term goal of neighborhood 
stability.  
The tide of neighborhood stabilization policy is in constant flux and vulnerable 
neighborhoods always pay the price of poorly implemented policy. The foreclosure crisis, 
however, threatens to undermine the free alienability of real property that makes the real 
estate market function. It also promises to tear the social fabric of neighborhoods across 
the country. The societal impact of the current crisis is not confined to the poor, the 
elderly, and minorities like the 1990s foreclosure crisis (Immergluck, 2006) . The impact 
on the physical form of every neighborhood, new and old, rich and poor, from the inner-
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city to the exurbs, is potentially crippling. Unbelievably, the only federal policy explicitly 
targeting the problem is woefully inadequate and completely unintelligible to the average 
person.  It would be better to do nothing than deliver false hope to communities in need, 
and the nation cannot afford to do nothing. 
There is probably no other policy area that is characterized by such inconsistency 
and waywardness. Grants to local law enforcement to eradicate marijuana are clearly 
related to the overriding national goal of controlling the illicit drug trade; a grant to equip 
an airport with metal detectors is clearly related to the overriding federal goal of national 
security.  In both cases, changes in ends and means of implementation are predictable and 
incremental. The apparent goal of NSP 1, however, was to slow the economic contraction 
and minimize the contagion effect of foreclosure. Through the legislative process and 
implementation, the program – with just a few billion dollars spread across the entire 
country – was intended to stimulate GDP growth, eliminate blight, and provide low-
income housing.  
Overall, NSP1 has been a failure. A more effective and direct policy to   address 
the foreclosure crisis would be to directly subsidize the occupancy of vacant housing and 
reduce the costs of housing to households. The macro-level goals of the program were ill-
defined and contradictory. In the jurisdictions examined here the process of incremental 
implementation by local governments and their contractors either compounded the 
problems created by foreclosure or had no effect at all. In the Etzioni mixed scanning 
framework, clear macro-level goals become guiding principles for micro level 
implementation.  
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A more effective neighborhood stabilization program and more thoughtful 
housing policy generally, must come from the political process. Holzer’s proposition that 
planners and public managers should “steer” the “ship of the state” is deeply flawed 
Bureaucratic managers may have the expertise necessary to formulate fact-driven policy, 
but they lack democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the reality that elected legislatures and 
executives control the budgets of public entities negates managerial decision making at 
the macro-level.  Nonetheless, those who row the “ship of the state” make the 
incremental decisions that ultimately determine the success or failure of a policy. For this 
reason, no public policy can conform to Banfield’s articulation of the Rational Planning 
Model. The need for democratic legitimacy will introduce non-rational goals and 
motivations. A substantive policy area like housing and neighborhood integrity, which 
elicits deeply personal reactions, needs political as well as technical feasibility. Synoptic 
planning in housing policy is also especially vulnerable to the question of who defines 
rationality. Lindblom’s prescription to “muddle through” the implementation of 
politically viable programs is unhelpful. If this research shows anything conclusively it is 
that the path of least resistance yields no measurable results. Local governments 
implementing a national policy in a short period of time simply channeled federal funds 
into the well-worn paths of suburban sprawl and racial exclusion. 
Mixed scanning provides an evaluative framework to understand the efficacy of 
the NSP in Florida. The goals of NSP 1 were never clear. Not only were the multiple 
goals vague, they were at times contradictory. Micro-level actors were given no 
directives as to how to prioritize the goals and identify opportunities for selective 
application of the most attainable highest value policy goal. Moreover, the public and 
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private entities tasked with local implementation used the national policy goals primarily 
to write their action plans. Once they had the money in hand, for the most part, they went 
for easy acquisitions and over allocated funds to renovation of properties with low 
intrinsic market value. Simultaneously containing the contagion effect of foreclosure in 
middle class neighborhoods, and providing affordable housing to families to families 
earning 50% of AMI, through the same properties, only exacerbates the problem of 
neighborhood division and decline.  
The Etzioni two tiered framework indicates two important ways to avoid the 
mistakes of NSP 1 in future housing policy implementation. First, officials at the national 
level – both within the political process and through directives from HUD –  can 
prioritize their goals and provide direction for resource allocation when local 
implementation cannot practically achieve all policy goals simultaneously. Second, at the 
local level, administrators can confine their incremental choices to a menu of realistically 
attainable benchmarks. For instance, they can choose to adopt a strategy to either a) 
leverage existing networks and channel fund flows into several neighborhoods with the 
social and physical infrastructure to restore their stability (e.g. Silver Springs Shores and 
Country Club Estates); or, b) singularly focus upon one neighborhood with high intensity 
to break out of an advanced cycle of decline (e.g. West Ocala). These changes would 
affirm the pragmatic incremental decisions of micro-level administrators while also 
conforming implementation to the macro-level priorities determined through the political 
process.  
The two NSP neighborhoods examined here that actually appear to have 
stabilized, Silver Springs Shores, and Country Club Estates, were fundamentally healthy 
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communities before the crisis. They benefit from high social capital, quality building 
stock, and desirable locations. In Country Club Estates these neighborhood assets were 
leveraged through a comprehensive response from the Rockledge city government that 
went beyond the NSP. Sadly, the neighborhoods that languished before the foreclosure 
crisis, especially West Ocala and Golden Gate Estates, appear to be victims rather than 
beneficiaries of the NSP.  
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Appendix One: Regression  
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model 
Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 VAR00002
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: VAR00001 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .854
a
 .730 .460 10.14346 
a. Predictors: (Constant), VAR00002 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 277.993 1 277.993 2.702 .348
a
 
Residual 102.890 1 102.890   
Total 380.883 2    
a. Predictors: (Constant), VAR00002 
b. Dependent Variable: VAR00001 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 32.259 7.726  4.176 .150 
VAR00002 229.982 139.914 .854 1.644 .348 
a. Dependent Variable: VAR00001 
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Appendix Two: Marion Oaks NSP Properties  
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Appendix Three: Silver Springs Shores NSP Properties  
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Appendix Four: Rainbow Park NSP Properties  
 
 
